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Summary 
This study is an independent project conducted on Ulstein Shipyard. The focus of the thesis 
is on an analysis of the time compression in engineer-to-order (ETO) production networks 
of Ulstein Shipyard. The purpose of this thesis is to compress the total cycle time of Ulstein 
ETO production networks by integrating the value stream of a key supplier, WestCoat, into 
the Ulstein Shipyard value stream.  
 
This is a qualitative study and the design follows an exploratory case study. The research 
questions are linked to each other, meaning that solving the first research question gives a 
presumption to solve the next, in accordance with the exploratory research design. Literature 
review, with respect to ETO total cycle time compression, buyer-supplier relationship, lean 
construction and value stream mapping guide this study to add value to existing theories of 
ETO time compression in shipbuilding from the perspective of supplier value stream 
integration in the system.The data used in this study was collected through interviews, 
observations and the available performance reports of Ulstein Shipyard and WestCoat. All 
the data have been analyzed later with the objective of adding value to existing theories. 
 
The empirical findings show that there are significant wastes due to the nature of the buyer 
and supplier relationship, buyers’ feeble project planning, and a mismatch between planning 
and execution. Waste of time and material, and other wastes were identified in WestCoat’s 
activities. More importantly, the major findings and issues were observed in Ulstein 
Shipyard’s planning activities. All these findings show that the total cycle time of Ulstein 
Shipyard’s production networks is increasing and there are opportunities to compress the 
total cycle time by integrating WestCoat’s value stream into that of Ulstein Shipyard. Thus, 
alternatives of the way forward have been presented to reduce the total cycle time. In 
addition, a current state value stream map has been drawn and a future state map of the 
supplier activities in the buyer value stream has been developed as a model to achieve the 
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1.0 Introduction  
 
The Norwegian offshore industry is one of the world’s largest and most modern in terms of 
technology. Shipbuilding companies engaged in this industry participate in all phases of 
petroleum activities—from initial seismic surveys to production and, finally, 
decommissioning of non-producing fields. Nowadays, the shipbuilding market is too 
competitive in delivering ships with advanced technology, high quality and on time to 
customers. Thus, this industry needs to deliver ships on a competitive delivery time frame.  
During the 1980s and 1990s, most of these shipyards activities were outsourced and 
generated many competitive suppliers in the industry (Guvåg et al., 2012). Therefore, quite 
a large number of suppliers providing different products, material, services and solutions 
offer their services to these shipbuilding companies. These companies also require the 
suppliers to remain competitive. As many shipping companies outsource their core activities 
to these suppliers in different scale, there is a growing necessity to compress the ships’ 
delivery time along with integrating the suppliers into the shipbuilding companies.  
1.1 The ship building industry in Møre og Romsdal  
Møre og Romsdal is the most mentionable shipbuilding industry in Norway. The maritime 
industry in Møre og Romsdal consists of about 212 companies. Among them are 165 
suppliers of maritime equipment and services, 14 shipyards, 15 ship consultants and 19 
shipping companies. In 2012, this cluster had a calculated turnover of around 47 billion 
NOK. The number of permanent employees the same year was about 15,000. Including hired 
labor, the maritime cluster employed around 20,000 workers (Hervik et al., 2012).  
In a research about the ripple effect of STX OSV, a shipyard now known as VARD, Oterhals, 
Johannessen and Hervik (2011) found that Norwegian suppliers supplied 66 percent of 
equipment and services. For suppliers in Møre og Romsdal, the share was 42 percent. The 
share purchased from low-cost countries was as low as 34 percent, which included 
outsourced production of hull. This is an indication that the supplier industry in Møre og 
Romsdal is significant for shipyards, and there are some consequential effects of these 
industries on the total supply chain management of the shipyards.  
According to Aslesen (2006), Norwegian shipbuilding is characterized by a sequential 
processing of products leading to a complete ship. During this sequential processing, several 
actors work simultaneously while the product is stationary for the outfitting phase. More and 
more of the work is outsourced to suppliers as work packages. As the variations among the 
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suppliers and the personnel can be high, shipbuilding in Norway is project-based where each 
new ship gets a project number and an own project organization to control the project. Each 
project usually has unique technical solutions and a system of actors that are temporarily put 
together to do the building, and has similarities to the construction industry (Aslesen 2006). 
Naturally, these project-based activities have limitations on time and cost, creating a 
necessity to streamline suppliers’ activities in terms of company strategy. 
Therefore, as per the requirements of this thesis, there was focus on compressing the total 
cycle time of Ulstein Shipyard’s production networks by integrating the value stream of a 
key supplier, WestCoat, into Ulstein Shipyard’s value stream. One actor from the 
shipbuilding industry, one shipyard and one supplier will be used for an analysis in this case 
study. Some background information about the companies will be presented in the following 
sections. 
1.2 Ulstein Shipyard AS 
The companies in the group are gathered under the holding company, Ulstein Group ASA, 
whose primary objective is business development across the organization. The company was 
originally founded in 1917 as Ulstein mek. Verksted. The group has around 800 employees 
in seven countries and is headquartered in Ulsteinvik, Norway. The Ulstein Group is the 
parent company of a maritime group (see Figure 1) of operating companies within design 
and solutions, shipbuilding, power and control, sales and aftermarket services, property, 
ownership of buildings and plants, shipping, ship ownership and investments (Ugland and 




Figure 1: Ulstein Group organization chart. 
Source: Ugland and Gjerstad (2010). 
 
Ulstein Shipyard builds a wide range of highly effective and sustainably efficient vessels 
that include offshore support, offshore construction, and seismic and research vessels. 
Ulstein Shipyard mainly produces “prototypes” of ships and usually only one or two ships 
with the same design are produced by it. The design is often sold to other shipyards after 
production at Ulstein Shipyard is completed. According to Ulstein (2015), it has a strong 
focus on innovative technological solutions and methods. It also has strong expertise within 
project management, effective logistics and pre-outfitting techniques. It uses a collaborative 
approach and has streamlined production processes, achieving a high level of flexibility and 
quality in the process.  
The main yard is based in Ulsteinvik, Norway. In addition, the shipyard has a department in 
Vanylven, Norway, where steel sections for the main yard are built (Ulstein, 2015). Ulstein’s 
vision is “to create tomorrow’s solutions for sustainable marine operations”. It has three key 
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areas they focus on—innovation, expertise and quality. These three together create added 
value for customers (Ulstein, 2015).  
1.3 WestCoat AS  
WestCoat AS (WestCoat) is a Norwegian company located in Ulsteinvik, Norway. Its main 
competence is in surface treatment of ships. The company was founded in 2008 and merged 
with NorCoat AS, a peer which had been in the industry since 2002, in 2010. WestCoat has 
two employees in administration and 80 in operations.  
Today, the company’s only customer is Ulstein Shipyard, and it is a full-service supplier of 
the following services: sandblasting, painting, metallization and scaffolding. WestCoat 
delivers manpower and equipment for these services included in both new builds and repairs 
at the shipyard (WestCoat, 2015). As Ulstein Shipyard does not have its own painting 
department, WestCoat is included in the planning phase, and much more involved in the 
early stages of planning and execution of the outfitting phase. 
1.4 Relevance of the Study 
This study seeks to find a way for compressing time in Ulstein Shipyard’s production 
networks as well as a way forward to integrate suppliers’ value stream into the shipyard’s 
value stream. As there was prior research done on Ulstein Shipyard’s supplier integration, 
this work is a step-ahead research to investigate the streamlining of the value stream of 
suppliers into that of the shipyard. SMARTProd had Lean Shipbuilding II (2011–13), an 
innovative project supported by the Regional Research Fund for Central Norway focused on 
methods for developing the flow in critical processes within the internal supply chain, testing 
a principle for creating more reliable material flows, identifying bottlenecks associated with 
external production to enhance the capability of the organization, and fostering collaboration 
and learning within the organization. In a nutshell, therefore, this is a continuation of the 
research under the SMARTprod project in Ulstein Shipyard and in collaboration with the 
Molde Research Centre. 
1.5 Research problem and Research Questions 
1.5.1 Research Problem 
In this section, the research problem for this thesis is outlined. This includes the background 
for this thesis, and the problems and challenges that Ulstein Shipyard is currently facing. 
This will be summed up by two research questions. 
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This thesis is part of a project between Ulstein Shipyard, the Molde Research Centre, 
(Møreforskning Molde) and Molde University College and WestCoat. The project is called 
SMART prod, and the idea behind it is to industrialize the shipbuilding process. The project 
will span over three years, and the main goal is to create an industrial shipbuilding strategy 
within a value creating supplier network. Within this main goal, there are some secondary 
goals. 
 
1. Develop a strategic concept of time compression in engineer to order (ETO) 
shipbuilding in Ulstein Shipyard. 
2. Develop a joint integration model with the suppliers to stimulate innovation in 
material and production technology, working methods and product improvements. 
 
In line with this strategic goal, another thesis was conducted under SMARTprod project. It 
was primarily based on buyer-supplier relationships in an ETO environment. That thesis also 
sought a way to handle shorter production time by suppliers in the ETO environment (Rød, 
2014). 
 Rød (2014) summarized this by developing an industrialized shipbuilding method where 
modules are equipped in parallel; through a closer integration with suppliers, the following 
things are expected to be achieved. First, a 10 percent reduction in internal production cost. 
Second, an increase in production from 3.2 to 5.2 ships a year. If this is achieved, there is a 
calculated potential to reduce costs by 57.6 million NOK and increase revenues by 36 
million NOK per year. 
The current thesis works under SMARTprod project is continued with the same greater goal 
of industrialization of shipbuilding. However, this thesis only investigates the value stream 
integration of a single supplier, WestCoat. 
Therefore, this thesis is one of the deliveries—the second—from this project. Its focus will 
stay within the secondary goals of SMARTprod project, and seeks to explore the issues that 
cause waste and delays in the integration process of one of the supplier’s value stream into 
that of Ulstein Shipyard. 
The thesis have been conducted on WestCoat. It is one of the key suppliers and works on 
the sandblasting and painting tasks for Ulstein Shipyard projects. When discussing about 
Ulstein Shipyard’s suppliers, this can be equaled to subcontractors that come to the shipyard, 
deliver and install their products on a ship. This means that they are part of actual production 
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and do not only deliver goods or materials, but also perform the actual work of preparing 
and installing their products on the ship. 
This way, they are more service suppliers compared than goods suppliers. However, 
WestCoat only delivers sandblasting and painting services through its workforce. Ulstein 
Shipyard supplies the sand and paints for the tasks. 
Ship manufacturing is always a sequential job and done by several different actors (Aslesen, 
2006). At Ulstein Shipyard, suppliers have to carry out their tasks and activities in the 
following way: each of the suppliers gets a time slot in the project plan to finish its work in 
a specific block or area of the ship. When a supplier is finished with one area, another 
supplier takes over, and often there are several suppliers working simultaneously in the same 
area. This way of coordinating the work flow creates many challenges, bottlenecks 
dependencies and reworks in the shipbuilding process. According to Aslesen (2006), this 
demands a high degree of coordination and planning of the outfitting, partly because several 
actors are involved and partly because the outfitting happens inside the ship in a limited 
physical space or in areas where several tasks are simultaneously performed. Some of these 
problems are raised and communicated in a kickoff meeting for this project with Ulstein 
Shipyard. 
If suppliers cannot start their tasks at the planned time or tasks are not finished within their 
time slots, those tasks in a particular area of the ship would be delayed. Although not all 
delays are critical for the completion of the ship, there are problems that can arise if delays 
occur. An example of this is that if one supplier is delayed, it also creates problems for the 
other suppliers who are ready to begin the subsequent jobs but cannot until the previous 
supplier has finished.  
The suppliers next in queue have their workers ready to take over but cannot start until the 
previous work has been completed. The result of this can be that they will need to wait or 
they can sometimes start working on other parts of the ship. In both instances, these create 
inefficiencies such as waiting, moving people and material around, and changes in the plans. 
Thus, by following the Toyota Production System (TPS), there is a scope of research as 
Liker (2004) stated that the heart of the TPS is delivering value by eliminating waste and 
ensuring an undisturbed workflow. 
There is an overall scope of research on process, tasks and sub tasks of ship construction 
within the light of the TPS and lean production as it has been observed wastes of time and 
associated resources in different phases. Conversely, research has been conducted on 
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WestCoat’s tasks of sandblasting, treating and painting in the Ulstein Shipyard outfitting 
phase.  
1.5.2 Research Questions 
To solve a research problem, it is important to define interesting research questions that 
should be answered through empirical investigations. According to Yin (2009), the process 
of defining the research questions is probably the most important step to be taken in a 
research study. 
By observing the findings from empirical investigations, exploration was conducted on how 
to compress total cycle time (TCT) in the Ulstein Shipyard ETO production networks with 
a focus on a single supplier integration. This leads to the title of the thesis. 
 
Time compression in ETO production- A Case study of Ulstein Shipyard. 
 
While elaborating the first part of the title, the first research question is found: 
 
Research question 1: How to compress the TCT in Ulstein Shipyard’s ETO 
production networks? 
 
The first question is the general question on TCT compression in Ulstein Shipyard’s ETO 
environment. To make it more specific, a second question is necessary. As discussed, there 
is focus on value stream integration of a supplier into Ulstein Shipyard’s value stream. 
Therefore, the second research question is: 
 
Research question 2:  How to integrate a supplier’s value stream into that of Ulstein 
Shipyard? What are the obstacles and benefits?  
 
This second question is quite specific. It narrows down the capacity of research into the 
domain of a single supplier namely, WestCoat. While trying to find the answers of these 
“how” questions, some relevant “what” questions also surfaced in research question 2. While 
investigating the second research question the probable obstacles in expected value stream 
integration of the buyer and the supplier will be sought. Subsequent consequential obstacles 
and benefits will also be discussed in same research question. 
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1.6 Structure of the paper 
 
The thesis is divided into several parts. In Chapter 1, there is a short description along with 
a brief picture of the shipbuilding industry in Møre og Romsdal, Ulstein Shipyard and 
WestCoat. This chapter also represents the relevance, limitations of the study along with a 
description of the research problem and questions. The second chapter discusses the 
literature review—TCT, ETO, buyer-supplier relationships, supplier integration, lean 
construction and value stream mapping (VSM). The third chapter represents the research 
methodology. This chapter discusses the details of how this research is conducted to reach 
its goal along with its strengths and weaknesses. In Chapter 4, the case study findings are 
analyzed, where the real scenario as observed is depicted. Chapter 5 represents a discussion 
and analysis to draw the outcome of the research to see whether the study goal could be 
achieved .Chapter 6 describes conclusion and Chapter 7 represents limitations and further 

























2.0 Literature Review 
This section discusses the literature review for the research. The review is formulated in a 
way that as much as possible of the relevant literature from different sources can be covered. 
Literature review can be categorized into two parts: where the subject matter of this thesis 
is represented and where the subject matter is not represented or if there is any scope for 
value addition in existing theories. In fact, value addition in existing theories is one of the 
prime interest points of the research. Therefore, through this work, there will be an attempt 
to fill the research gap by adding some new value to existing research.  
The literature review starts with the concept of the Total Cycle Time (TCT) and its different 
perspectives. Later on, the TCT is connected with the concept of ETO to explore whether 
time compression is possible in ETO. Then, ETO is integrated with the supply chain process 
where there is a presence of a buyer-supplier relationship, relationship norms and 
dependence, assertiveness and cooperativeness in managerial decision-making, and 
complexity of trust in a buyer-supplier relationship. After that, lean construction principles, 
and lean manufacturing tools are discussed followed by an analysis on VSM. 
2.1 Total Cycle Time (TCT) 
The TCT is defined as “the elapsed time between customer enquiry and customer need being 
met is shown to be a fundamental driver in achieving enhanced business performance” 
(Mason-Jones and Towill, 1999). Especially in the agile supply chain, time compression has 
become an important key enabler. The approach of time compression has become so 
powerful that it is now known as a paradigm.   
Towill (2008) also argued, in a construction supply chain and TCT handbook, that the TCT 
compression paradigm can be simply expressed as “the principle of reducing the time taken 
to execute a business process from perception of customer need to the satisfying of the 
need”. The author said that industrialists in the UK, such as Jack Burbidge (1983) and John 
Parnaby (1995), were early advocates of the paradigm. Likewise, management consultants, 
such as Stalk and Hout (1990), widely publicized the approach.  
Later, there was further contribution from Thomas (1990) and a consultant to the work of 
Stalk and Hout (1990). From their research, it was found that subject to proper reengineering, 
all normal performance criteria are bettered (Mason-Jones and Towill 1999). They stated 
that the TCT compression paradigm is now widespread and, because of its universal appeal 
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and strategic advantage, is sometimes alternatively known as time-based management 
(TBM), as coined by the Boston Consulting Group.  
The leverage exerted may well be sector-dependent and a powerful reason for ongoing 
research in construction. Thus, it is assumed that this paradigm has a very important 
relevance to construction in the shipbuilding industry. An increase in productivity, an 
improvement in quality, a reduction in cycle time and an expedition of innovative products 
to market have been the primary objectives of time compression (Hui, 2004).  
Meanwhile, Thomas (1990) established two very important key points associated with TCT 
compression programs. First, the only worthwhile goal is to reduce the TCT from a customer 
need right through to the satisfaction of that need. Second, a TCT compression program not 
only reduces the expected cycle time, but achievement on target also has to be guaranteed.  
This argument expresses the particular notion of the relevance and necessity of discussing 
on-time compression in this thesis on Ulstein Shipyard, as ETO time compression by 
satisfying diversified customized needs, are embedded in a necessity for a deeper look at the 
expected cycle time of both Ulstein Shipyard and the supplier company. 
The importance of a discussion on the TCT is manifold. To find out these important reasons, 
there were some detailed industrial case studies despite the reluctance of companies to 
release the information or give executives time to write up a meaningful account of the 
change program (Towill, 2008). One aerospace industrial result is shown in Table 1. They 
confirm that good reengineering of the product delivery process (PDP) is rewarded by an 
improved performance measured by every business metric, that is, no tradeoff or engineering 
compromise is required. 
 
Table 1: Manufacturing industry case study perspective. 
Source: Typical results quoted by (Parnaby, 1995) on-time compression paradigm applied to aerospace 
actuator company. 
Benchmark  Improvement 
Lead time                                                                                                               Down 75%
Manufacturing costs                                                                                                  Down 75%
Material movements                                                                                                  Down 90%  
Inventories    Down 75% 
Work in progress                                                                                                        Down 75% 
Adherence to schedule                                                                                                Up to 30%




For further evidence, another example of a survey can be mentioned. Schmenner (1988) 
summarized the results obtained in a large-scale experiment (several 100 companies) by 
surveying three different market sectors, and testing the results for correlation between cause 
and effect. Of the various 10 factors tested for statistical significance, only TCT reduction 
was found to have a significant impact on productivity (Towill, 2008).  
Subsequently, he also added that any change program which links customer needs to 
customer satisfaction must take either an end-to-end or a systems approach. Time as an 
explicit target is self-explanatory as it is a performance metric that travels unambiguously 
across company and national boundaries. In addition, the focus on learning is a necessary 
prelude to continuous improvement in performance (Thomas, 1990). 
At this level, the importance of business process mapping needs to be discussed. Researchers 
tried to find out available time compression possibility. Due to this background, a small brief 
on business process is required. Business process means a range of activities between a 
customer need and that need being satisfied (Towill, 2008). He gave an example of a single, 
integrated design and described a construction business process known as T40, and explained 
that TCT compression takes a holistic view of the organization. This reengineering is 
preceded by the creation of a total systems model, usually called the process map of the 
business, he added.  
Towill (as cited in Evans, Naim and Towill, 1997) agreed that a detailed, highly structured 
mapping approach has been given in a construction example of the reengineering process or 
how things are done with the highest possible standard (a procedure usually associated only 
with what we do) using the TCT as an explicit performance metric against which an 
alternative design may be compared. Towill (2008) regrettably described that many 
executives want to skip the mapping part of reengineering wrongly believing that the 
business process is clear. The same executives then became curious about why reengineering 
programs fail to deliver the predicted benefits. The truth of the matter is that one fact is 
worth a dozen opinions and one process flow chart contains a dozen facts.  
Therefore, a flow chart is an essential and major step in reliable business process modeling 
(Towill, 1997). He also argued that an erroneous model of a business process is potentially 
every bit as damaging to a company as an erroneous model of an artifact.  
Towill (2008) also explained further about time compression and stated that if a reliable 
flow chart of the business process is available, various practical reengineering ideas to 
reduce the TCT may be explored. Some process charts are indeed laid out such that the 
 12 
activity may be immediately recognized as either essential or otherwise (Scott and 
Westbrook, 1991).  
While trying to measure the TCT, the T40 concept can be a useful project. To illustrate this, 
there was a case study devised to enable a new industry-wide process for construction. As 
shown in the figure below, the newly engineered process is capable of reducing time to 
complete construction by 40 percent resulting in consequential cost savings of 25 percent of 
the capital value (Ireland, 1996). An important outcome of T40 was the substantive evidence 
that the TCT compression paradigm applies to project-based companies and value streams 
(Towill, 2008). 
Towill (2008) also argued that the starting point of the T40 project was the knowledge that 
managing the process of producing a building, a civil engineering structure—such as a road 
or a bridge—or an oil refinery involves a similar set of processes. However, while there are 
similarities between projects, essentially every project is different and a prototype because 
the site is different and, hence, so is the design. Nevertheless, the T40 project is aimed at 
exploiting the practical similarities between projects as the basis for innovation in 
construction. Figure 2 depicts the T40. 
 
 
Figure 2: Work-time relationship. 
Source: Retrieved from Ireland V. (1996). 
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According to Ireland (1996), the final integrated design and construction process requires 
the “whole solutions team” to be involved from the point of determining customer needs to 
those needs being satisfied. It requires some resolution like a clear specification of the 
customer’s needs, preferably in performance terms, he also added. This also needs the 
acceptance of responsibility by the whole team for the design and construction phases, 
significant changes from the current practice. The negotiated cost of a particular project, 
including reference to a third-party audit, can also be considered if necessary.  
2.2 Engineer-to-Order Production 
 
A widely used phenomenon in the field of industrial engineering is ETO. ETO 
manufacturers produce customer-specific products that require unique engineering or design 
work, or significant customization activities. Typically, small production quantities, 
including different versions and a huge variety of parts, must be managed (Camelot ITLab, 
2014). Camelot ITLab (2014) also said that since a significant proportion of the total cost 
and lead time is incurred in the early phases, competitive planning processes must set in at 
the very beginning of the lifecycle and manage the complete lifecycle on an ongoing basis. 
Generally, the ETO supply chain is regarded as a supply chain where the “decoupling point” 
is located at the design stage, so the customer order comes in at the design phase of a product. 
The decoupling point is often called the customer order decoupling point (CODP). Primarily, 
ETO production is associated with large, complex project environments in sectors such as 
construction and capital goods (Gosling and Naim, 2009). 
Therefore, while discussing ETO, a comprehensive discussion on the decoupling point has 
also been covered simultaneously in the light of the product process matrix. Hayes and 
Wheelwright (1984) explained the different job nature in terms of the unique unit size in 
their product-process matrix. They also explained that shipbuilding is a low volume and high 
variety project-based task. This project-based task is highly technical and complicated, and 




Figure 3: ETO and customer order decoupling point. 
Source: Hayes and Wheelwright (1979). 
 
Olhager (2012) has discussed elaborately on the CODP. He argued that the CODP has been 
traditionally defined as the point in the value chain of a product. Sharman (1984) and 
Olhager (2003) stated that sometimes the CODP is called the order penetration point. 
Olhager (2003) also said that different manufacturing situations—such as make to stock 
(MTS), assemble to order (ATO), make to order (MTO) and ETO—all relate to different 
positions of the CODP (Figure 3).  
Olhager (2003) continued by saying that the CODP, thus, divides the operations stages that 
are forecast-driven (upstream of the CODP) from those that are customer order-driven (the 
CODP and downstream). Sharman (1984) argued that the CODP is also the last point at 
which the inventory is held.  
Thus, the inventory at the CODP is a strategic stock point since delivery promises are based 
on the stock availability at the CODP and the lead times and capacity availability for the 
customer order-driven activities downstream the CODP (Olhager, 2003). Olhager (2012) 
stated that there is a strong consensus in the literature on CODP on the fact that the 
operations upstream are significantly different than those downstream, based on the fact that 
the upstream material flow is forecast-driven whereas real customer orders dominate 




Figure 4: Different customer order decoupling points. 
Source: Sharman (1984). 
 
Olhager (2012) said that this has implications for many aspects of the manufacturing value 
chain. Areas that have been treated in the literature include operations strategy (Olhager and 
Ostlund, 1990; Olhager, 2003), logistics systems (Hoekstra and Romme, 1992), 
manufacturing planning and production control (Giesberts and van der Tang, 1992; van der 
Vlist et al., 1997; Olhager and Wikner, 1998, 2000), manufacturing focus (Hallgren and 
Olhager, 2006), and supply chain planning (Olhager, 2010). Other papers have treated the 
CODP more generally for a certain area of application, such as the Finnish paper and pulp 
industry (Lehtonen, 1999) and the Dutch food industry (van Donk, 2001). 
According to Christopher (2000), it is important to recognize that there are actually two 
decoupling points. He said that the first is the material decoupling point, and should ideally 
lie as far downstream as possible in the supply chain and as close to the final market place 
as possible. Christopher (2000) also stated that the second decoupling point is the 
information decoupling point.  
Ideally, this should lie as far upstream as possible in the supply chain as this is the furthest 
point in which information on real, final demand reaches. The challenge is to develop “lean” 
strategies up to the decoupling point, but “agile” strategies beyond that point. By managing 
these two decoupling points, a powerful opportunity for an agile response can be created 
(Christopher, 2000). 
Hicks, McGovern and Earl (2000) stated that there are three stages of interaction between 
ETO companies and their customers. The first stage is marketing, which provides an 
opportunity for the companies to identify market trends, technical and non-technical 
customer requirements, and customer criteria for assessing competing offers. 
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The second stage is tendering that involves the preliminary development of a conceptual 
design and a definition of major components and systems. A technical specification, delivery 
schedule, price and commercial terms are agreed upon. They also explained that 75–80 
percent of costs are committed at this stage. 
The third stage takes place after a contract has been awarded and includes non-physical 
processes—such as design and planning—and physical processes associated with 
manufacturing, assembly and commissioning.  
Supply chain management in ETO companies involves the coordination of internal 
processes across these three stages. Tendering, design and contract management are 
considered to be core capabilities in these companies. These often lead to more attention 
being paid to product capability and features than to design for manufacture or assembly. 
This results in increased costs and excessive variety (Hicks, McGovern and Earl, 2000). 
Hicks, McGovern and Earl (2000) also described that a key competitive factor in ETO 
markets is delivery performance. Improving performance has two components: reducing 
lead time and increasing the reliability of lead time estimates. Lead time reduction has been 
achieved by shortening the duration of individual processes and by increasing the 
overlapping of previously sequential activities. Improvements in technology, such as the 
application of large, multifunctional machine tools, can reduce process time and improve 
dimensional accuracy. This, in turn, reduces assembly time and variability. 
Hicks, McGovern and Earl (2000) stated that the research undertaken has shown that ETO 
companies can be classified according to the level of vertical integration. Two types of 
design and contract business can be identified. In the first type, all items from suppliers are 
delivered to the site and the ETO company carries out the construction and commissioning 
phase of the work. In the second type, either suppliers or subcontractors undertake all 
physical activities with only marketing, design, procurement and project management being 
performed internally. 
Hicks, McGovern and Earl (2000) also stated that in considering the appropriate level of 
vertical integration, ETO companies seek an optimum response to a number of factors. 
These include reconciling customer delivery times with available capacity, reducing costs, 
the availability of capital for investment in equipment, the potential utilization of a plant, 
internal and external capabilities, and flexibility. These factors vary from firm to firm, giving 
rise to differing levels of vertical integration. This variability makes it difficult to prescribe 
best practices for supply chain management in ETO companies.  
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Hicks, McGovern and Earl’s (2000) observations on ETO companies suggest that there has 
been a trend towards vertical disintegration driven by financial pressures and the need for 
cost reduction. Vertical disintegration can increase flexibility by making alternative product 
configurations possible, but it can also reduce the scope of concurrent engineering and 
flexibility to deal with design changes.  
 
 
Figure 5: Vertically integrated ETO Company. 
Source: Hicks, McGovern and Earl (2000). 
 
To illustrate Figure 5, Hicks, McGovern and Earl (2000) stated that the approach to the 
outsourcing of manufacturing activities varies from firm to firm. A common approach has 
been to concentrate on assembly processes as these are considered to result in high levels of 
added value. Some companies have also retained jobbing processes when manufacturing 
technologies or other capabilities provide a competitive advantage.  
In some cases, such as the production of large, heavy components, in-house manufacturing 
capability is necessary due to a lack of potential suppliers. At the other extreme, some ETO 
companies have outsourced all manufacturing, assembly, construction and commissioning 
activities as a mechanism for minimizing overhead costs. The company produces, in low 
volumes, the main product that has a deep product structure.  
This typically consists of a number of major subassemblies that have medium levels of 
product structure that are delivered to the customer’s site for final assembly. These 
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subassemblies are produced from a range of components that are manufactured using 
jobbing, batch and flow processes. An example would be a large steam turbine generator. 
According to Naslund and Willamson (2000), Stock and Boyer (2009) defined supply chain 
based on a synthesis of a wide range of suggestions provided by a variety of practitioners, 
academics and hybrid sources. They deconstructed the commonalities in all the reviewed 
suggestions in order to develop their definition of Supply Chain Management (SCM) as “the 
management of a network of relationships within a firm and between inter-dependent 
organizations and business units consisting of material suppliers, purchasing, production 
facilities, logistics, marketing, and related systems that facilitate the forward and reverse 
flow of materials, services, finances and information from the original producer to final 
customer with the benefits of adding value, maximizing profitability through efficiencies, 
and achieving customer satisfaction” (Stock and Boyer, 2009, p.706). 
Naslund and Willamson (2000) stated that to some extent, the SCM definitions seem to 
indicate a move away from the chain analogy to a network analogy. Hertz (2001) also 
discusses the supply chain network as “the network that supplies a specific product or 
product group following the chain from raw material to the final consumer”. Lambert et al. 
(2005, p.25) write that “given that a supply chain is a network of companies, or independent 
business units, from original supplier to end-customers, management of this network is a 
broad and challenging task”. 
 
2.3 Supply Chain Integration and Collaboration 
According to Angerhofer and Angelides (2006), the objective of a collaborative supply chain 
is to gain a competitive advantage by improving the chain’s overall performance through a 
holistic approach rather than by improving each link independently. The belief is that 
increased collaboration will lead to a seamless, synchronized supply chain which, in turn, 
will lead to improved customer service, lower costs and higher profits (Holweg et al., 2005).  
Other potential benefits of supply chain collaboration include improved flexibility, better 
utilization of resources, shortened as well as improved control of delays, and increased 
quality and development of competency, each of which will lead to lower costs and higher 
profits (Gruat La Forme et al., 2007). A more general benefit of increased collaboration is 
the positive effect that supply chain collaboration has on key performance indicators, thus 
leading to increased profits (Angerhofer and Angelides, 2006). Supply chain collaboration 
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has emerged as one of several phrases used to describe efforts for creating long-term 
competitiveness. 
2.3.1 Supply Chain Integration  
Naslund and Willamson (2000) claimed that although the topic of supply chain integration 
may not be formally defined, Lambert et al. (1998) mean that the goal of supply chain 
integration is to enhance total process efficiency and effectiveness across members of the 
chain. Many authors emphasize both the strategic and operational importance of integration 
of supply chains (Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001; Zailani and Rajagopal, 2005).  
From a strategic perspective, Ajmera and Cook (2009) discussed supply chain integration as 
partners with joint authority, which will share resources, benefits and risks. Similarly, supply 
chain integration is sometimes interpreted as a high level collaboration in which the involved 
parties act as one entity within an extended enterprise (Wen et al., 2007). Newman et al. 
(2009) stated that supply chain integration has a broader and longer-term perspective 
compared to supply chain collaboration.  
One stated benefit of integration is the network’s ability to design products faster, with 
higher quality and lower costs, as compared to a single company (Ajmera and Cook, 2009). 
Sharing a similar philosophy, Ragatz et al. (2002) listed a number of potential benefits from 
supply chain integration. Integration can add expertise and information regarding new ideas 
and technologies into each partner’s system. Integration can help identify problems as well 
as solutions ahead of time, facilitate outsourcing and reduce the internal complexity of 
various projects. In addition, integration can improve communication and information 
exchange between companies. Finally, the researchers claimed that integration can reduce 
rework and overall project costs. 
Cousins and Menguc (2006) presented two different types of integration. They focused on 
internal integration, found within an organization, and external integration, observed across 
organizational boundaries and between firms within a supply chain. The basic level of 
supply chain integration, intra-organizational process management emphasizes that the 
different functional areas within a company should act as a part of an integrated and 
coordinated process rather than as functional “silos” within the company (Morash and 
Clinton, 1998).  
The second level of supply chain integration refers to inter-organizational collaborative 
integration (Bowersox, 1990). Close, interactive, long-term relationships with customers 
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and suppliers are the main characteristics of collaborative integration. The focus is on the 
behavioral, communicational and interactive flows of the supply chain. 
Therefore, the inter-organizational relationship among Ulstein Shipyard and its suppliers 
play a vital role in its supply chain integration. 
 
2.3.2 Buyer-Supplier Relationship 
Developing the right sourcing strategy in managing the firm’s supplies is critical for today’s 
managers. They realize the long-term impact of their sourcing strategies (make or buy, 
supply-base structure, and the nature of the buyer-supplier relationship) on the profits and 
the efficient functioning of the organization (Park et al., 2012). 
Terms like outsourcing, downsizing, streamlining suppliers and forming strategic 
partnerships with suppliers have become part of today’s business jargon. They reflect 
changes in business practices. Streamlining suppliers and forming strategic partnerships 
with suppliers means a prime manufacturer and its suppliers are involved in relational 
exchanges rather than spot market exchanges (Park et al., 2012). 
Park et al. (2012) said that since sourcing has a significant effect on the bottom line of a 
company, it has become a major strategic option. The strategic aspects of sourcing can be 
analyzed from many different dimensions. Gadde and Hakansson (1994) categorized them 
into three strategic choices: (1) the question of make or buy, (2) the supply-base structure 
and (3) the nature of the buyer-supplier relationship. 
However, due to the relevance of the research problem of this thesis, discussions will be 
focused on the buyer-supply chain relationship. 
Parties involved in a transaction need to safeguard against the hazards of opportunism and 
harness the high powered incentives of markets. Kreps (1990) introduced reputation as a 
self-enforcing device of the trust-honor arrangement, using the well-known prisoner’s 
dilemma to prove the value of cooperation in repeated transactions. Partnerships emerge as 
a means of reducing the hazards of opportunism and utilizing market incentives. Such 
relational exchanges between buyers and sellers are not new.  
Macaulay (1963) observed that two norms are widely accepted: “(1) Commitments are to be 
widely accepted in almost all situations; one does not welsh on a deal. (2) One ought to 
produce a good product and stand behind it” (1963, p. 63). McNeil (1980) distinguished 
between discrete and relational contracts and identified relational norms—role integrity, 
preservation of the relationship and harmonization of relational conflict and supra contract 
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norms. Transaction costs may be reduced when parties involved in transactions honor those 
relational norms. 
 
2.3.3 Relational Norms and Dependence 
Relational norms may be described as the values shared among exchange partners regarding 
what is deemed appropriate behavior in a relationship (for example, Heide and John, 1992). 
When buyer-supplier relationships are characterized by high relational norms, exchange 
parties are more committed (Gundlach et al., 1995) and exhibit a long-term orientation 
(Ganesan, 1994), thus lowering future negotiation costs (Artz and Norman, 2002).  
Over the last two decades, closer supply chain relationships exhibited by high relational 
norms—such as trust, collaboration, long-term relationship and increased information 
sharing—have evolved in many industries to help firms respond to changes (Droge and 
Germain, 2000; Hoetker et al., 2007; Monczka et al., 1998; Sengün and Wasti, 2007; 
Whipple and Frankel, 2000). Relationships with low relational norms are characterized by 
distributive (Walton and McKersie, 1965) or aggressive (Ganesan, 1993) bargaining 
behavior.  
Chanchai and Young (2009) summarized that the use of legal contracts governs these 
relationships and aggressive bargaining tactics are used to resolve disagreements. In short, 
high relational norm relationships may be characterized as partnerial or cooperative, while 
low relational norm relationships tend to be “arm’s length” or competitive.  
2.3.4 Relationship Continuance 
Chanchai and Young (2009) quoted that research has shown that expectations of continuance 
in buyer-supplier relationships are strong when there are shared values between the 
exchange partners regarding what constitutes appropriate behavior in the relationship 
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994). It has been argued that the presence of relational norms increases 
the expectancy of relationship continuity (Joshi and Arnold, 1998).  
These norms can take on relevant dimensions such as flexibility, information exchange and 
solidarity, to name a few (Heide and John, 1992). Under conditions of high relational norms, 
buying firms have a high expectation of relationship continuity and low expectations under 
low relational norms (Joshi and Arnold, 1998). Besides, evidence has shown that in some 
buyer-supplier relationships, the effect of trust is a deterrent to relationship dissolution and 




If firm relationships are characterized by thin relational networks, mutual lack of knowledge 
and weak inter-dependence, the relationships tend to be fragile and dissolvable when 
exposed to changes in supply and demand (Hallen and Johanson, 2004). 
 
2.3.4 Assertiveness and Cooperativeness in Managerial Decision-making 
Wilmot and Hocker (2001) base negotiation, or conflict management, strategies on a two-
dimensional framework: assertiveness and cooperativeness. They base this framework on 
the five different negotiation strategies provided by Kilmann and Thomas (1975)—
avoidance, accommodation, collaboration, competition and compromise.  
According to Wilmot and Hocker (2001), assertiveness is required when a tendency of 
concern for oneself exists, and cooperativeness is required in the presence of concern for 
others. The greater the concern for self, the greater an individual’s assertiveness tendency, 
whereas the greater the concern for others, the greater an individual’s cooperativeness 
tendency.  
Using Kilmann and Thomas’ (1975) negotiation strategies, a high level of assertiveness 
would be exhibited by an individual engaged in competition and collaboration strategies, 
and a low level of assertiveness would be exhibited by an individual engaged in 
accommodation and avoidance strategies.  
Chanchai and Young (2009) added that a high level of cooperativeness would be exhibited 
by an individual engaged in collaboration and accommodation strategies, and a low level of 
cooperativeness would be exhibited by an individual engaged in competition and avoidance 
strategies. 
2.3.5 Buyer-Supplier Relationship—Complexity of Trust 
Buyer-supplier relationships focus on established inter-organizational “transactions, flows, 
and linkages” between the vendor of a product or service and the purchaser of that service 
(Oliver, 1990). Koulikoff-Sourviron and Harrison (2006, p. 77) identified seven dimensions 
of the buyer-supplier relationship with their accompanying characteristics, briefly explained 
in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Dimensions and characteristics of buyer-supplier relationship. 




Since buyers and suppliers may have divergent interests, with the supplier wanting to obtain 
the highest reasonable price and the buyer seeking the lowest possible cost, the management 
of the relationship between a buyer and a supplier is inherently subject to conflicts and 
pressures (Moeller et al., 2006). Mukherji and Francis (2008) noted that it requires constant 
mutual adaptation, inter-dependence and joint action to create a relationship in which both 
parties have a high level of trust in each other. Sengün and Wasti (2007) noted that the 
relationship between the parties balances trust, control and risk as the buyer and supplier 
pursue their distinct but syncretic agendas. 
 
2.3.5 Complexity of Trust and Distrust 
According to Josh et al. (2009), scholars consistently defined trust as a key “aspect of 
relationships” that is “varied within person and across relationships” (Schoorman et al., 
2007, p. 344), but perspectives about the exact nature of trust have varied widely. The 
relationship between trust and vulnerability associated with risk is common to many 
discussions of trust (cf. Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999; Kjaernes, 2006; Mayer et al., 1995; 
Searle and Ball, 2004). 
About the overlap of trust and distrust, Lewick et al. (1998, p. 439) explained that “speed, 
quality, and global reach, which require trust, also have precipitated distrust through 
corporate restructuring, downsizing, and fundamental violations of psychological 
contracts”. Baruch and Lambert (2007) explained that distrust produces organizational 
anxiety in addition to individual anxiety. Thompson and Bunderson (2003) noted that 
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violation of the perceived psychological contract that exists between parties is interpreted as 
both a serious ethical breach and destroyer of trust. 
Josh et al. (2009) pointed that Caldwell and Clapham (2003, p. 358) identified six factors 
that measured organizational-level trustworthiness—including honest communication, task 
competence, quality assurance, interactional courtesy, legal compliance and financial 
balance. In assessing the decision to trust another person, each party evaluates the other 
party’s behavior about the perceived psychological contract and duties owed through a 
subjective mediating lens, and makes the decision of whether or not to trust (Caldwell and 
Clapham, 2003). Adapting the Caldwell and Clapham (2003) framework to the buyer-
supplier relationship, Josh et al. (2009) proposed a diagram indicated in Figure 6 as a model 
for understanding the decision to trust that exists in this relationship. 
 
 
Figure 6: Model for buyer-supplier decision to trust or distrust. 
Source: Josh et al. (2009). 
 
Josh et al. (2009) also added that each of the six factors of organizational trustworthiness 
identified by Caldwell and Clapham (2003) may play a key role in the personal calculus 
through which the buyer or supplier ascertains whether the other party’s behavior is ethical 
and trustworthy. Table 3 defines each of those six factors and provides an example of how 
each factor may be interpreted in the buyer-supplier relationship (Caldwell and Clapham, 
2003, pp. 353–359). 
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Table 3: Six factors of trustworthiness and their practical applications. 




Finally, Josh et al. (2009) said that building trust at the organizational level is dependent on 
the ability of the parties involved to communicate that they are trustworthy and to 
demonstrate that trustworthiness by consistent behavior (Schoorman et al., 2007). However, 
trust building also requires recognizing that the other party may have a separate agenda, a 
different set of values and a unique perspective about the goals and objectives to be 
accomplished in the potential partnership (Hosmer, 2008).  
The buyer-supplier relationship provides an opportunity for the parties to build a relationship 
that is mutually beneficial, but the implicit nature of that relationship can be challenging and 
difficult to negotiate (Mukherji and Francis, 2008; Saccani and Perona, 2007). Josh et al. 
(2009) added that by understanding and honoring the expectations of the other party, both 
the buyer and the supplier can build mutual trust and can make meaningful headway in 
pursuing the opportunity for a shared benefit. Communicating about mutual expectations, 
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honoring commitments and working in a partnership can allow both parties to build trust 
while maintaining a reputation as ethical and committed partners. 
2.4 Outsourcing 
An important part of Ulstein Shipyard is the outsourcing of different tasks to many suppliers. 
Therefore, this section will be covering outsourcing. 
Brandes et al. (2012) stated that the standard recipe for outsourcing, in literature and in 
practice, is to keep core activities and resources in‐house. For complementary resources and 
capabilities, partnership relationships are recommended and for standard solutions to buy 
“at arm’s length” (Cox, 1996). However, what is considered core is changing over time. 
Porter (1980a, 1980 b) stated that outsourcing can also be seen as a radical contrast to the 
conventional wisdom of competitive strategy since it is a way to achieve a combination of 
two strategies—cost leadership and differentiation— at the same time. 
2.4.1 Five Different Logics of Outsourcing 
Brandes et al. (2012) described five different logics for outsourcing: cost cutting, core 
competence focus, control, flexibility and access to external resources. 
Brandes et al. (1997), and Lonsdale and Cox (1997) described that the first logic is cost 
cutting or the lowest cost. Cost is often considered the most important criterion for an 
outsourcing decision. A comparison has been made between the cost for in‐house production 
and external sourcing.  
Williamson (1979) divided costs into production and transaction costs. From a transaction 
cost perspective, the company is primarily considered a governance structure. Transaction 
costs include a number of ex ante costs—such as drafting and negotiations—and ex post 
costs—such as monitoring and enforcing agreements (Rindfleich and Heide, 1997).  
Brandes et al. (2012) argued that a trade‐off exists between transaction and production costs. 
In‐house control will typically involve lower transaction costs, but, at the same time, will 
sacrifice the potential for economies of scale and the collective pooling of resources found 
in an outsourcing/market solution.  
Brandes et al. (2012) summarized from Prahalad et al. (1990), Grant (1991) and Javidan 
(1998) that the second logic is based on long‐term competitiveness rooted in the 
corporation’s core competence. By definition, the core competence has complex and 
systemic properties with tacit knowledge and competences embedded in organizational and 
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cultural contexts. Organizational learning is important for the development of core 
competence. 
Brandes et al. (2012) also pointed out the following strategic implications of this 
perspective:  
1.  Core competence should be kept in‐house.  
2. The availability of important complementary resources in partnership relationships 
should be secured.  
3.  The supply of commodities should be done via the market mechanism (Brandes et al., 
1997; Lonsdale and Cox, 1997). 
4. Outsourcing decisions might require upgrading of competence (Quinn and Hilmer, 
1994; Harrison and Kelly, 1993).  
Brandes et al. (2012) explained that the concept of core competence has many aspects in 
common with Williamson’s concept of transaction costs. Hamel and Hene (1994) stated that 
core competence is not a simple skill or asset and can range from “what one does best” to 
“what the customers value the highest” (Nordigarden, 2007). Some researchers argued that 
the application of a resource‐based view to outsourcing has been the most vital development 
during the last decade (Espino‐Rodriguez and Padron‐Robaina, 2006). 
The third logic, control, is based on the assumption that outsourcing should be avoided in 
cases where there is a high risk of supplier opportunism. A dominant supplier with unique 
resources (high asset specificity) and an information advantage (information asymmetry) 
might behave opportunistically (Londsale, 2001). Andersson et al. (2008) argued that a 
supplier’s high prices are not only a cost problem, but the buyer could also lose control of 
lead times (time‐to‐market and time‐to‐customer), quality and product development. 
Brandes et al. (2012) summarized from Greaver (1999), Abrahamsson et al. (2003) and 
Carlson (2005) that the fourth logic, flexibility, is important in its own right in a highly 
dynamic environment. It is tempting to try to transform fixed costs into variable costs by 
outsourcing, especially when companies face a need for investments in new machinery, 
factories or IT systems.  
Nordigarden (2007) claimed that this situation can trigger outsourcing decisions. A 
combination of in‐house production and outsourcing can also be a viable solution. Brandes 
et al. (2012) added that a high degree of uncertainty regarding new technology could lead to 
outsourcing as a firm seeks to maintain flexibility and reduce costs at the same time. 
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About the fifth logic, access to superior external resource, Deavers (1997) mentioned access 
to world‐class competence as one of the top five reasons for outsourcing. Harrison and Kelly 
(1993), Fine and Whitney (1999), and Quinn (2000) also claimed that the ability to exploit 
external resources puts the management of supplier relationships into focus. 
2.5 Toyota Production System and Lean Production  
2.5.1 Toyota Production System 
TPS was devised by Eiji Toyoda and Taiichi Ohno for the Toyota Motor Company in 1977. 
TPS is the next major evolution in efficient business processes after the mass production 
system invented by Henry Ford, and it has been documented, analyzed and exported to 
companies across diverse industries throughout the world. Outside of Toyota, TPS is often 
known as “lean” or “lean production” (Liker, 2004).  
The cornerstones of the TPS (lean production) are the pull system and built-in quality; their 
sustainability is ensured by kaizen activities on a daily basis. Meeting and exceeding 
customers’ requirements is the task of everyone within the organization. The heart of the 
TPS is delivering value by eliminating waste and ensuring an undisturbed workflow (Liker, 
2004). It is also necessary to emphasize that lean is about developing and customizing 
principles that are right to a specific organization (for example, a shipyard) and diligently 
practicing them to achieve high performance that continues to add value to customers and 
society. This, of course, means being competitive and profitable (Liker, 2004). 
2.5.2 Lean Manufacturing 
The story of lean begins with the TPS, developed after the Second World War by Eiji Toyoda 
and Taiichi Ohno for Toyota. At that time, Toyota was a small company and needed a 
production system capable of rapid changes in kinds and models (Liker and Lamb, 2000). 
TPS was the next major evolution in efficient business processes after the mass production 
system invented by Henry Ford, and it has been documented, analyzed and exported to 
companies across diverse industries throughout the world (Liker, 2004). James Womack’s 
book, entitled The Machine That Changed the World (1990), is a straightforward account of 
the history of automobile manufacturing combined with a study of Japanese, American and 
European automotive assembly plants. What is new is the phrase “lean manufacturing” 
(Womack and Jones, 1990). 
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2.5.3 Basics of Lean Manufacturing 
The heart of the TPS is delivering value by eliminating waste and ensuring an undisturbed 
workflow. Outside of Toyota, TPS is often known as “Lean”, “Lean Production” or “Lean 
Manufacturing” (Liker, 2004). Lean manufacturing caught the imagination of 
manufacturing in many countries and implementations are now commonplace. The 
knowledge and experience base are expanding rapidly (Diekmann et al., 2004). 
To put it simply, the main idea behind lean is to maximize customer value while minimizing 
waste. The ultimate goal, which is very hard and almost impossible to achieve, is to provide 
perfect value to the customer. This can be achieved by having a perfect value creation 
process with zero waste (Lean Enterprise Institute, 2009). This section presents the concepts 
of value and waste. 
2.5.4 Lean Manufacturing Tools  
One goal of our thesis is to integrate WestCoat into Ulstein Shipyard’s ETO production 
networks. Our proposition to reach this goal is to implement an efficient lean tool. Using 
this lean tool will help us identify the activities where waste occurs, understand the 
characteristics of waste occurrences, and remove those wastes from the internal 
manufacturing and external supplier contexts. This will help create opportunities for greater 
integration of the supplier into the shipyard’s ETO production networks and to mitigate the 
dependencies and bottlenecks that arose between WestCoat and the production networks. 
Moreover, implementing those lean tools is highly relevant to answer the second question 
in our thesis of how to integrate the supplier’s value stream into Ulstein Shipyard’s value 
stream. 
According to Monden (1993), there are three types of operations in an internal 
manufacturing context that people engage in as they relate to the customer: 
1) Value adding operations involve the conversion or processing of raw materials or semi-
finished products through the use of manual labor. These activities include subassembly 
of parts, forging raw materials and painting body work. 
2) Non-value added operations are a pure waste and involve unnecessary activities, such as 
waiting time, stacking intermediate products and double handling, which should be 
eliminated completely.  
3) Necessary but non-value adding operations seem wasteful, but are necessary under 
current operating procedures. Examples include unpacking deliveries and transferring a 
tool from one hand to another. It is necessary to make major changes to the operating 
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system, such as creating a new layout or arranging for suppliers to deliver unpacked 
goods, in order to eliminate these types of operation.  
Womack and Jones (2003) stressed that lean mainly depends on one critical starting point 
called value. According to S. Tyagi et al. (2014), value can be defined only by the customer, 
and it can measure the manufacturer’s efficiency when the product is delivered at a 
reasonable price at an appropriate time in the right amount.  
Singh and Singh (2013) stated that one of the major challenges for the manufacturing 
industry is to make different products with a minimum lead time, reduced inventory and 
world class quality. There is a need to help manufacturing companies to improve their 
competitiveness. 
In recent times, many organizations have either attempted to implement or have already 
implemented lean manufacturing. Some companies have implemented a few tools, 
techniques, practices and procedures of lean manufacturing, while others have implemented 
a whole spectrum of lean manufacturing elements (Gurumurthy and Kodali, 2009). 
The objective of lean manufacturing is to reduce waste in every part—such as human effort, 
inventory, time to market and manufacturing space—to become more responsive to 
customer demand while producing quality products in the most efficient and economical 
manner (Womack et al., 1990). 
Lean manufacturing encompasses many different strategies and activities that are familiar 
to almost all industrial engineers (Braglia et al., 2006; Chitturi et al., 2007; Mahapatra and 
Mohanty, 2007). In many such cases, firms have reported some benefits by applying lean 
principles; however, it is apparent that there is a need to understand the entire system in 
order to gain maximum benefits (Singh et al., 2010). VSM acts as an enterprise improvement 
tool in lean manufacturing to assist in visualizing the entire production process, representing 
both material and information flow. Many managers and researchers such as Hines et al. 
(1998), Hines (1999), Abdulmalek and Rajagopal (2007), Serrano et al. (2008) and Singh et 
al. (2009) applied VSM for identification and elimination of waste in production industry. 
2.5 Value Stream Mapping (VSM) 
Rother and Shook (1999) explained that a value stream is comprised of all activities (both 
value added and non-value added required to bring a product or a group of products from 
the raw material stage to the customer. According to Hines and Rich (1997), value stream 
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refers only to the specific parts of the firms that actually add value to a specific product or 
service under consideration. 
According to Brown et al. (2014), VSM is an important tool used in lean manufacturing to 
identify and visualize waste. Gurumurthy and Kodali (2010) mentioned that VSM is a 
pencil-and-paper visualization tool that shows the flow of material and information as a 
product makes its way through the stream. 
Rother and Shook (1999) said that the ultimate goal of VSM is to identify all types of waste 
in the value stream and to take steps to eliminate them by implementing a future-state value 
stream that can become a reality within a short period of time. Womack and Jones (2003) 
proposed five lean management principles forming the backbone of VSM:  
1) Specify value for the product from the customer’s point of view. 
2) Identify the value stream and eliminate waste. 
3) Make the value flow. 
4) Let the customer pull (value) rather than push to customers. 
5) Pursue to reach the level of perfection. 
Similarly, Rother and Shook (1999) stated that four steps are involved in VSM in order to 
design and introduce a lean value stream (Figure 7): 
 
Figure 7: Value stream mapping steps. 
Source: Rother and Shook (1999).  
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1) Selecting a product family by focusing on one product family from the customer end of 
the value stream as the target for improvement instead of drawing all product flows 
considered too complicated (Rother and Shook, 1999). 
2) Drawing a current state map by using measurements such as cycle time, setup time and 
lead time in order to examine the production floor and to analyze the complete path a 
product takes through the plant according to the major processing steps, wherever 
material or information flows occur (Rosentrater and Balamuralikrishna, 2006). A 
current state map serves as the basis for developing the future state map. 
3) Developing a future state map which demonstrates the output of the proposed changes 
based on the gaps identified in the current state map (Tyagi et al., 2014). A future state 
map is a picture of how the system should look after the inefficiencies in it have been 
removed. Drawing a future state map is done by answering a set of questions on issues 
related to efficiency and on technical implementation related to the use of lean tools 
(Abdulmalek and Rajagopal, 2008).  
4) Conducting a work plan to implement the future state map based on the differences 
between the current and future state maps (Arbulu and Tommelein, 2002). Rother and 
Shook (1999) explained that this work plan shows what plan to draw and by when, 
measurable goals and clear checkpoints with real deadlines, and named reviewers 
(Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: Yearly value stream plan. 
Source: Rother and Shook (1999). 
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Before implementing the developed future state map, company has to engage a person who 
will be the manager of the value stream to execute the future state map. Value stream 
managers’ job is to lead the people who will operate the process in all business functions 
and to be responsible for the cost, quality and delivery of the product in the current state 
while mapping and leading the implementation of the future state. First, the value stream 
manager has to do the following tasks: 
1) Breaking implementation of the developed future state into steps: 
It is not possible to implement the entire future state concept at once, as it looks at the entire 
flow through the company’s facility. Therefore, they suggested dividing the company’s 
future state value stream map into segments or loops.   
2) Create a value stream plan: 
Company’s future state map shows where to go. Rother and Shock (1999) stated that once 
the value stream manager have a sense for the basic order in which he or she want to 
implement the elements of expected future state vision, the value stream manager needs to 
write them down as the yearly value stream plan. Additionally, the value stream manager 
needs to create a yearly value stream plan that shows: 
 What plan to do and when to do it? 
 Set measurable goals. 
 Set checkpoints with real deadlines and named reviewers.  
The value stream manager can start the plan implementation by focusing on achieving 
continuous improvements in loops of the developed future state value stream. Loops 
improvements include: develop a continuous flow, establish a pull system and eliminate 
wastes in the value stream. Figure 8 display a yearly value stream plan where the value 
stream manager can set objectives, measurable goals and keep tracking of the execution of 
the value stream plan. Yearly value stream plan used also as a performance indicator to 
evaluate the manufacturing performance quarterly or monthly. Moreover, continuous 
improvements in the process achieved through focusing on the unsuccessful objectives and 
goals in the yearly value stream plan instead of focusing on the accomplished objectives and 
goals.   
3) Management responsibility: 
Rother and Shock (1999) stated that value stream improvement is primarily a management 
responsibility. Management has to understand that its role is to see the overall flow, develop 
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a vision of an improved, lean flow for the future, and lead its implementation. One cannot 
delegate it. He or she can ask the front lines to work on eliminating waste, but only 
management has the perspective to see the total flow as it cuts across department and 
functional boundaries.  
Rother and Shock (1999) also stated that from the combined experience with many 
companies in range of industries over the past fifteen years the following are needed: 
-Constant efforts to eliminate overproduction. If one eliminates over production the system 
will have great flow. 
-A firm conviction that lean principles can be adapted to work in given setting, coupled with 
a willingness to try, fail and learn. 
In other note Rother and Shock (1999) stated that many errors simply occurred with the 
territory when implementing change in long established mass production practices. If one 
does it right, each approach will be nearer to the target and will add to the understanding 
level. Such reiteration is a normal part of any lean implementation effort and success will be 
achieved those who have the determination to personally work through the obstacles. 
They also added that management needs to dedicate time and to really learn this stuff for 
themselves- learn it to the point that the can actually teach it. Then they need to teach it. Not 
primarily in the classroom (although there is a place for that), but in their daily interactions 
with their staff. At whatever level, from CEO to plant floor supervisor, the words and deeds 
of managers must be pushing the creation of a lean value stream. It simply will not work if 
it is relegated to a few minutes at the weekly staff meeting. It is got to be part and parcel of 
every day’s activities. Practice the mapping concept presented here to the point that it 
becomes an instinctive means of communication. 
Rother and Shock (1999) also added that one will need a way to get people to follow his or 
her lead, without always waiting for ones to lead them. Begin by focusing ones organization 
on a relatively small number of specific target (e.g. manage by value stream maps). One may 
recognize this as policy deployment. They also added that eventually, one should evolve to 
policy management, which is much more dynamic process where lower levels of the 
organization take part in formulating policy as well as carrying it out. As you learn 
organization matures, you will find the policy begins to emerge from interactions between 
levels of the organization, rather than simply emanating from above to be deployed by 
below. 
Rother and Shock (1999) urged executioners that lean promotion group has to be actually 
on the plant floor. This team has to be involved in leading the changes, embracing a “hands 
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on” approach to problem solving, while paying attention to the actual needs of the 
organization and customers. They added that the only way to learn lean methods is to apply 
the techniques hands on with a bit of coaching. 
Finally, they added that lean value stream must be developed with respect for people. 
However, respect for people should not be confused with respect for old habits. Developing 
lean value streams can be hard work, often with one-step back for every two forward.  
Developing a lean value stream exposes sources of waste, which means that people in all 
business may have to change habits. They believed that every management and employee 
has a role to play in lean implementation, and that everyone should feel a benefit from it. 
These benefits can come in many forms: increased competitiveness of the company, a better 
working environment, greater trust between management and employees and not least a 
sense of accomplishment in serving customer. 
2.6.1Value Stream Mapping Tools 
According to Hines and Rich (1997), several authors—like New (1993), and Jessop and 
Jones (1995)—have developed individual tools to understand the value stream. Hines and 
Rich (1997) argued that those authors viewed their creations as the answer rather than as a 
part of a jigsaw. Moreover, Hines and Rich (1997) claimed that the tools developed by those 
authors do not fit well with the more cross-functional toolbox required by today’s best 
companies. Therefore, Hines and Rich (1997) constructed a typology of seven new tools in 
terms of the seven wastes in the TPS—over production, waiting, transport, inappropriate 
processing, unnecessary inventory, unnecessary motion and defects—to allow for an 
effective application of subsets of the complete suite of tools.  
The value stream tools are: 
1. Process activity mapping. 
2. A supply chain response matrix. 
3. Production variety funnel. 
4. Quality filter mapping. 
5. Demand amplification mapping. 
6. A decision point analysis. 
7. A physical structure.  
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Hines and Rich (1997) highlighted the importance of the mapping process, saying a 
researcher will be able to utilize the benefits associated with each tool in order to conduct a 
more detailed analysis of the value stream with a view to its improvement. They drew a table 
from a variety of origins where the tools are correlated with the seven types of wastes and 
they suggested that, in order to make improvements in the supply chain, an outline 
understanding of the particular wastes to be reduced must be gained before any mapping 
activity takes place. This is depicted in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4: Seven value stream mapping tools. 
Source: “The seven value stream mapping tools” (Hines and Rich, 1997).  
 
 
Hines and Rich (1997) suggested using a process activity mapping tool drawn from the 
industrial engineering origin in order to map the value stream. Process activity mapping 
originates from industrial engineering, which adjusts several techniques in order to eliminate 
wastes at the work place, inconsistencies and irrationalities. Furthermore, industrial 
engineering techniques provide high quality goods and accelerated cheap services. 
According to Hines and Rich (1997), there are five stages for the process activity mapping 
approach:  
1) Studying the flow of processes. 
2) Identifying the wastes. 
3) A more efficient sequence for the rearrangement of the process to be considered. 
4) A better flow manner, including the varied flow layout or transport routing to be 
considered. 
 37 
5) Ensure that everything that is being done in each stage is necessary and understanding 
the consequences of removing the superfluous tasks to be considered. 
Simply, according to Hines and Rich (1997), the process activity mapping tool includes the 
following steps: 
1) Conducting a preliminary analysis of the undertaken process. 
2) Recording the details of all the required items in each process. 
The result of conducting those steps is explained in a map for the process under consideration 
in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Process activity mapping. 




The basis of this approach is, therefore, to try and eliminate activities that are unnecessary, 
simplify others, combine yet others and seek sequence changes that will reduce waste. 
Afterwards, a calculation and recording can be done for the total distance moved, the time 
taken and the involved people.  
The completed diagram (Table 5) could be used as a basis to conduct further analyses and 
subsequent improvements by using the 5W1H technique. The 5W1H technique asks 
questions such as:  
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1) What is the activity to be executed? 
2) Who is responsible to execute this activity? 
3) How the activity will be executed?  
4) Where the activity should be executed? 
5) When should the activity be executed? 
According to Shingo (1988), why an element does not comprise a specific phenomenon is a 
question that must be asked about the other five elements in pursuit of the purposes. 
Moreover, he stated that one must ask, “Why is what being selected as the problem?” and 
“Why is who doing it?” When a problem arises, it should be viewed in terms of its five 
components: what, who, how, where and when. The question why should then be asked about 
each of the components. 
 
Figure 9: Five elements of production 5W1H. 
Source: Retrieved from Shingo (1988). 
2.7 Lean Construction 
Even though lean production was highly successful in the car manufacturing industry, many 
believed that it would not be applicable to the construction industry. The construction 
industry is compared to the car industry which is highly dynamic and complex. The 
construction industry operates in a highly uncertain environment. Furthermore, the industry 
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has substantial schedule and time pressures which makes it fundamentally different from the 
car industry (Dugnas and Oterhals, 2008). 
2.7.1 Lean Construction Principles 
In various subfields of the new production philosophy, a number of heuristic principles for 
flow process design, control and improvement have evolved. There is ample evidence that 
the efficiency of flow processes in production activities can be considerably and rapidly 
improved through those principles (Koskela, 1992). The principles are believed to be crucial 
to lean construction. However, most of them also apply to lean manufacturing (Koskela, 
2000). Koskela added that in general, the principles are applicable to both the total flow 
process and its sub-processes. In addition, the principles implicitly define flow process 
problems, such as complexity, in either transparency or segmented control. The principles 
are presented below. 
 1. Meeting the requirements of the customer.  
2. Reducing non-value adding activities.  
3. Reducing cycle time.  
4. Reducing variability.  
5. Increasing flexibility.  
6. Increasing transparency. 
It is also necessary to emphasize that lean is about developing and customizing principles 
that are right for each specific organization and diligently practicing them to achieve a high 
performance that continues to add value to customers and society (J.K. Liker, 2004). 
2.8 Lean Shipbuilding  
Dugnas and Oterhals (2008) said that the worldwide research in this area is limited. First, 
such limitation is due to the fact that lean shipbuilding is actually quite similar to lean 
construction. Second, the term itself has yet to become a concept with a solid theoretical 
base. They primarily discussed Norwegian shipyards. 
The shipbuilding industry in Norway bases its production on different phases due to specific 
competition conditions. The key trend now is to outsource the hull fabrication and primary 
outfitting to low-cost countries. The remaining work is done at outfitting yards in Norway. 
Hence, there are usually four key production phases (Dugnas and Oterhals, 2008):   
1. Hull fabrication.  
2. Primary outfitting.  
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3. Final outfitting.  
4. Testing. 
Within the lean shipbuilding program, the concept of project logistics is understood as the 
flow of parts and components within a shipyard facility. The focus is on the optimization of 
internal logistics by analyzing and modeling transportation time and equipment, 
prefabrication and assembly time, facility layout, and storage of parts and components. 
Simplification, visualization and information flow are the key words here (Dugnas and 
Oterhals, 2008). 
Dugnas and Oterhals (2008) also said that while project logistics is dealing with internal 
issues, phase-based project management has a wider scope and mainly addresses the project 
(construction) activities carried out in later project phases than initially planned. Keeping in 
mind the complexity of such one-of-a-kind projects that contain thousands of work 
packages, the lack of control of phases and their transition pose a significant threat. In the 
Norwegian shipbuilding context, this means project cost, disruption of workflow and 
planned work sequence, and overburdening of the workforce, which, ultimately, can result 
in the delayed delivery of the final product. Global supply chains make the situation even 
more complex. 
2.9 Lean Shipbuilding in Ulstein Shipyard 
According to Oterhals and Guvåg (2014), Ulstein Shipyard is developing a new concept for 
shipbuilding, i.e., project-based production. The concept is intended to reduce the 
throughput time for vessels under construction by focusing on everything which is not 
conducive to creating value, production and adjacent features.  
The concept has the following four basic elements: 
1. A systematic analysis and measurements of the main processes (and in relation to 
production). 
2. Continuous improvements. 
3. Involvement of employees. 
4. Organizational learning. 
The aim of the project has been to raise productivity and lower production costs by 
developing and adopting methods that contribute to increasing the reliability and 
predictability of construction projects. 
It is focused on two overarching issues: 
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2.9.1 Project Logistics  
The term project logistics has been introduced as part of the concept. Project-based 
production has its own logistics requiring specific adaptations that relate to purely physical 
conditions and organizational conditions seen from a value chain perspective. 
2.9.2 Social Logistics 
 The term social logistics has been used actively in the change process to focus on the social 
interaction within this type of production—prim0arily, the inter-dependence that exists 
between activities, disciplines and functions (both directly related to production and adjacent 
features). 
2.10 Summary of the Literature Review 
This chapter was started with the discussion on the concept of the Total Cycle Time (TCT) 
and its different perspectives. Afterwards, the TCT was connected with the concept of ETO 
to explore whether time compression is possible in ETO. Subsequently, ETO is integrated 
with the supply chain process where there is a presence of a buyer-supplier relationship, 
relationship norms and dependence, assertiveness and cooperativeness in managerial 
decision-making, and complexity of trust in a buyer-supplier relationship. Finally, lean 





3.0 Research Methodology 
 
This chapter will elaborate the research methodology and research design. Initially, the 
research design will be explained. After that a brief discussion will be presented on case 
study research method, case study type and action research. Finally, different types of 
relevant data collection methods and the types of data that were collected for this thesis will 
be discussed. 
3.1 Research design 
Research design can be defined as “a logical plan for getting from here to there, where here 
may be designed as the initial set of questions to be answered, and there is some set of 
conclusions (answers) about these questions” (Yin, 2009, p. 26). The purpose of using 
research design is to avoid a situation where the evidences do not address the initial research 
questions. According to Yin (2009) there are five main components of research design:  
3.1.1 Study questions:  
Study questions indicate what type of research should be used in the study. The main 
objective is to describe the study questions and their purpose. Relevant research strategy 
questions starts with, who, what, and where query. Similarly, the typical case study questions 
start with how and why query.  
3.1.2 Study propositions: 
 A study proposition gives the direction from where the research should be started on top of 
its general study questions. However, Baxter and Jack (2008) argued that because of 
researchers lack of experience, knowledge or information, proposition cannot be presented 
in an exploratory case study. According to Yin (2009) some studies may have a legitimate 
reason for not having any propositions.  
3.1.3 Unit of analysis:  
An important feature of research design is choosing the unit of analysis. The unit of analysis 
can be a company, an individual person, an event or an entity (Yin, 2009). Similarly, case 
studies have also been done about decisions, programs, the implementation process, and 
organizational change. Therefore, in this study, unit of analysis is total cycle time 
compression.  
According to Voss et al., (2002), there is no clear definition of what is a single case or unit 
of analysis. Single case sometimes involve to the study of several contexts within the case 
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(Mukherjee et al., 2000). This is indicated in the research questions in which identifying the 
root cause of time waste and integrating the VSM of the buyer and the supplier are the key 
factors. 
3.1.4 Linking data to propositions: 
 There are different ways of data interpretations. One way of interpreting the findings is 
using statistical data. It can also be done comparing other explanations of previous research 
in similar studies. However, sometimes these techniques might not support current 
explanation for the desired result. 
3.1.5 Criteria for interpreting a study’s findings: 
 This can be statistical criteria, but it can also be about identifying and discussing other 
explanations that do not support explanation for the results. According to Ellram (1996), 
research methodologies can be classified as, “according to the type of data used and the type 
of analysis performed on the data”. The type of data can be divided into two categories, 
either empirical or modelled. Empirical data is often gathered for analysis from the real 
world, often via case studies and surveys. The data can also be modelled, where either 
hypothetical or real world data is manipulated by a model (Ellram, 1996). The following 
figure 10 shows classification of research methodologies based on the type of data and type 
of analysis: 
 
Figure 10: Basic research design. 
Source:  Ellram (1996).  
The research design in this study can be classified as empirical, since the study is of a real 
life company. The empirical study uses primarily qualitative analysis through a case study 
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of the company. According to Ellram (1996) qualitative results are often presented verbally 
to create an understanding of relationships or complex interactions.  
3.2 Case study as a research method 
Using case studies as a research method remains one of the most challenging social science 
endeavors (Yin, 2009). However, the choice of making case study or not depends on the 
research questions at a great extent. The more the research questions seek to explain the 
contemporary circumstances; how and why this particular social phenomenon works; the 
more the case study method is relevant. Similarly, this particular study is a case study. The 
choice of the research questions seek to explain some contemporary circumstances of an 
empirical problem.  
There are many different aspects of research based case studies. Case study research has 
several advantages. Voss et al. (2002), argued that unrestrained by the rigid limits of 
questionnaires and models, a case study can lead to new and creative insights. They 
suggested that this insights can help to build new theory with valid and strong background. 
In a case study some different aspects can be studied.  
Moreover, the ‘why’ kind question gives better understandings of the nature and complexity 
of the complete aspect (Meredith, 1998). Yin (2009), argued that the examination of a case 
research data is most often conducted within the context of its use. It means within the 
situation in which the activity takes place (Zaidah, 2007).  
On the contrary, there are several challenges in conducting a case study research. According 
to Voss et al. (2002), case study research is time consuming, it needs skilled interviewers. It 
was believed that there may have fair skills, if not very good skill to conduct an interview. 
Moreover, intensive care is needed to draw generalizable conclusion in ensuring rigorous 
research. There are chances of making mistakes or drawing erroneous conclusion.   
Additionally, direct observations are used to conduct case research. Direct observations need 
access to the phenomenon being studied which is time consuming.  
3.3 Case study type and case selection 
There are several categories of case studies existing in different literatures. Yin (2009) 
mentioned three categories of case studies. These are exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory. Yin (2009) further distinguished among single, holistic and multiple-case 
studies. Stake (1995) categorized case studies as intrinsic, instrumental, or collective. 
McDonough and McDonough (1997) categorized case study as interpretive and evaluative. 
This case study is an exploratory case study. 
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3.3.1 Exploratory case study 
An exploratory case study explores a phenomenon through the data, which serves as a point 
of interest of the researcher (Zaidah, 2007). According to Yin (2009) exploratory case study 
is conducted to those situation where the phenomenon is evaluated has no clear, single set 
of outcomes. One of the advantages of exploratory case study is it narrows down the scope 
of investigation.  
An exploratory case study should be preceded by statements about what is to be explored, 
the purpose of the exploration, and the criteria by which the exploration will be judged 
successfully. The SMARTprod project is conducted with the greater goal of bringing 
efficiency in Ulstein shipbuilding. This case study explored the tactics to compress the total 
cycle time. The purpose of the exploration is to compress total cycle time and integrate the 
value stream of a key supplier into Usltein shipyard value stream. The criteria to be judged 
for these case study have been discussed in literature review.  
3.4 Action Research  
In this thesis a real-life situation has been discussed, and an appropriate research 
methodology for this case has been described. Action research is an integration of research 
and action in several cycles of data collection, analysis and interpretation, planning and 
introduction of action strategies, and evaluation of these strategies through further data 
collection. The process continues in the same way into another cycle, and the series of cycles 
is stopped when someone decides to stop it, and then the final results may be seen and 
presented (Somekh, 2005). As more such action cycles are determined, new information will 
be discovered and new constraints will emerge (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010).  One main 
aspect of action research is the close co-operation between the researchers and the 
practitioners in a company who seek to solve a problem. According to Denscombe (2007), 
this gives a greater appreciation and respect for the knowledge possessed by the 
practitioners. The relationship between researchers and practitioners may also provide the 
project with valuable knowledge about understanding the situation and the workplace. This 
is the information that normally could be difficult to obtain with traditional researchers from 
outside (Somekh, 2005). This study has been conducted with close co-operation with 
company personnel of both the buyer and a key supplier. Both of the authors of this thesis 
were attached in Ulstein Shipyard for one week. The research has been evolved continuously 
through discussions and co-operation with key personnel of both Ulstein Shipyard and the 
key supplier company. As action research applies the existing knowledge to the situation 
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which is being studied, the aim is both to solve a practical problem and to build upon the 
existing knowledge through using data from the real-life situation in a particular field of 
study (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010 and Somekh, 2005). This is also the goal in this case as 
works have been done  with shipyard company and supplier company to come up with 
solutions of  practical problems as well as writing a thesis based on a theoretical framework. 
One of the advantages of action research as a method, as described by Denscombe (2007), 
is that one solves a practical problem where the results of the research are transferred into 
practice. Also, the participation of practitioners in the research can “democratize the research 
process” (Denscombe, 2007, p. 131). However, there are also some disadvantages. Using 
action research means that there will be some extra work for the practitioners, as they are to 
take part in the research. Further, the research is constrained by what is allowed and ethical 
in the workplace setting being studied. It is also more difficult to be impartial for the 
researcher in the approach to research (Denscombe, 2007). 
3.5 Data collection  
Data collection can be divided into two categories. The data can either be primary or 
secondary. Hox and Boeije (2005, p. 593) define primary data as “data that are collected for 
a specific research problem at hand, using procedures that fit the research problem best.” 
They define secondary data as “data originally collected for a different purpose and reused 
for another research question”. Primary data can be classified as qualitative or quantitative 
data. Qualitative data involve understanding of the complexity and context of the research 
problem. The qualitative data often consist of text, while quantitative data are described 
numerically (Hox and Boeije, 2005). Figure 11 presents a list of methods to collect both 
quantitative and qualitative primary data. 
 
Figure 11: Primary data. 
Source: Hox and Boeije (2005). 
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Yin (2009) identifies six sources of evidence that are most commonly used in case studies. 
None of the six sources have a complete advantage over the other sources. The six sources 
of evidence are: 
1. Documentation. 
2. Archival records. 
3. Interviews.  
4. Direct observations. 
5. Participant observation.  
6. Physical artefacts. 
In this case study, several of the six sources were used to gather information.  The sources 
of evidence that are used in this case will be presented briefly in following section preceded 
by  a brief discussion on interview and direct observations. 
3.5.1 Interview 
Interview is a useful method for data collection. Interviews used in case studies are normally 
more guided conversations than structured queries. It is vital to ask questions in a manner 
that provides the needed information, but the questions should at the same time be reasonable 
and easy to answer for the interviewee. Different types of interviews are in-depth-, focused-, 
and survey (more structured) interviews (Yin, 2009). 
In an in-depth interview the interviewer can ask about facts as well as the interviewee’s 
opinion on a subject. The interviewee may also be encouraged to come up with propositions 
that may be basis for further exploration. From such an interview the interviewer may also 
get suggestions on other sources of information.  
Sometimes the interviewee will have the role of an informant rather than a respondent, which 
is important to have in a case study. An in-depth interview may take place over several 
meetings within a time period. The interview may still contain open ended questions and be 
more like a conversation, but it follows more strictly a predefined set of questions. Survey 
interviews follow more structured and survey-like questions. This type of interview is 
mainly used to collect quantitative data in a case study and are analyzed as a regular survey 
(Yin, 2009).  
Ellram (1996) separates the interview technique into unstructured, semi-structured and 
structured interviews. Unstructured interviews are conversational, while structured 
interviews may be in the form of a questionnaire.  
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Using interviews when collecting data can have several strengths and weaknesses. 
Interviews can be targeted and the interviewer can focus his or her questions according to 
what he or she wants to find out. Also interviews can be insightful and give the interviewer 
information and explanations from the interviewee (Yin, 2009).  
Several weaknesses can also be mentioned about interviews as a data collection method. If 
the questions are not well formulated, the resulting information will not be as good as it 
could have been. Also the person being interviewed may provide inaccurate information due 
to poor recall. Another weakness is that the person being interviewed may be affected by the 
interviewer and answer what the interviewer wants to hear (Yin, 2009). 
3.5.2 Direct observations 
Direct observations may be useful to provide additional information about the topic. Direct 
observations can be both formal and casual data collection activities. Formal observations 
can be conducted to observe meetings, factory work and so on. Observations are made 
throughout the field visit, for example in connection with an interview or other data 
collection methods. These kinds of observations are more casual. The reliability of the 
observations increases with the number of observers (Yin, 2009). 
3.5.3 Primary data collection through observations and interviews 
The primary data collection in this case study has been done in several ways. First, it has 
been started with participants’ observations. However, direct observations needs a longer 
time compared with secondary data. Moreover, Yin (2009) argued that the situation might 
also be affected by the fact that it is being observed, and it may therefore proceed differently. 
Correspondingly, in this study direct observations were followed to some extent.  
To gather primary data, interviews have been done with some Ulstein and WestCoat 
managements. Hartley (2004) suggested that the first strategy in collecting data should be to 
get a general overview of the structure and functioning of the organization. In the interviews 
the authors learnt something of the history and present functioning of the organizations.  
Another valuable aspect in this was to walk around the organization observing the work flow 
and the work being undertaken. In the initial phase of the research an interview was held 
with shipyard’s planning management department guided by thesis supervisor. These 
interviews were helpful to gain an insight into the history and the current state of the 
Norwegian ship industry and how the shipbuilding process is. 
After developing an initial theoretical framework for which the interview guide was based 
on, a second interview round was done where a guided tour was taken in piping department 
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followed by interview with shipyard’s planning management team and coordinator. The 
reason for this interview round was to get a clear and better idea of work processes are, and 
the continuing relationship. 
In the third round, the authors were attached in shipyard for five days. They interviewed ship 
planners, ship planning head, last planning coordinator, supplier head and supplier 
supervisor. In addition, a guided tour led by Ulstein coordinator gave an extensive idea about 
how the activities are being taken place. All these interviews and guided tour were recorded 
as formal interviews. These interviews were based on complete theoretical framework of 
this thesis, and to get more information around the relationships in regards to the theoretical 
framework.  
Additionally, it was also intended to dig deeper to explore the interesting points discovered 
in the previous round. The last round of interviews were more in-depth than the previous 
ones and went more into the specifics of the relationship to see what works well, what does 
not work and what could have been better.  
3.5.4 Secondary data 
Hox and Boeije (2005, p. 593) defined secondary data as the “data originally collected for a 
different purpose and reused for another research question”. Similarly, there are some 
strengths and weaknesses associated with secondary data collection. Secondary data can be 
less time consuming and mostly less expensive compared with primary data.  
However, associating with a particular research area might be difficult as it had been done 
targeting other research objectives. Additionally, Hox and Boeije (2005) argued that it is 
important to be able to evaluate the quality of the retrieved data. Similarly, in the case of the 
qualitative data for this study, several sources were used to obtain information. These 
sources included the websites of Ulstein Shipyard, WestCoat and other maritime-related 
entities. Additional secondary material was gathered from different interviews.  
These were information on internal presentations of the company, job descriptions and 
visual images from selected pages in different information systems. Moreover, the 
quantitative data collected from the company was fully based on the data given by its 
management. These were the actual and planned timelines of activities and the deviations 
from them of the shipyard and its supplier. In addition to this, a large part of the secondary 
data was collected and obtained by searching in relevant literature and recent academic 
journals, PhD, master thesis and different websites.  
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3.6 Research methodology summary 
 
This research methodology chapter has given a direction on the methodology of conducting 
this thesis. The discussion has been started with a brief description on research design and 
its components. Thereafter the main frame of this study has been discussed. 
This research is an explorative case study conducted on a shipyard and its key supplier. This 
case study has analyzed a real life situation where researchers worked with close cooperation 
of company personnel and tried to come up solution with existing problem. Therefore, this 
research has been conducted in the frame of action research. Finally a brief discussion on 




4.0 Case Study Findings 
 
Based on the findings from the interviews, this chapter illustrates the involvement of one 
key supplier named WestCoat into Ulstein project phases alongside with focusing on the 
problems that occurred in the project outfitting phase. Project problems in the outfitting 
phase were observed and investigated from two perspectives. The first perspective was from 
Ulstein Shipyard and the next one is WestCoat perspective. Then an explanation has been 
provided about the information flow in the project outfitting phase accompanied with 
clarification of the causes of information flow gap in the outfitting phase. Afterwards, this 
chapter sums up with mentioning the process flow of WestCoat alongside with detailed 
explanation for their tasks in the project. Finally, case study findings from this chapter have 
been summarized and gathered in figure 12 and figure 13 which shows the findings from 
Ulstein Shipyard and WestCoat.  
 
 
Figure 12: Project phases of ULSTEIN SX 121 subsea ship.  





Figure 13: Involvement of WestCoat into the project phases of ULSTEIN SX 12. 
Source: Retrieved from Ulstein Synergi system (2015). 
 
4.1 Presale and project planning phases: 
According to the WestCoat management (personal communication, March 24, 2015)1 
WestCoat was involved in the Ulstein project from the presale phase, when the prices for a 
new ship were calculated. Moreover, they mentioned that WestCoat was included in the 
planning phase of the project because the shipyard did not have its own painting department.  
The information decoupling point in the project is located at this phase as it is the furthest 
point in which information on real, final demand reaches. 
WestCoat had a framework agreement for three years with fixed prices including a square 
meter price for finished work and an hourly price for reworks caused by other suppliers, they 
stated.  Based on the fixed per-square-meter prices, WestCoat and Ulstein Shipyard 
discussed and confirmed the area (in square meters) required to work on Ulstein project 
based on its design sketches. The shipyard’s relevant departments such as planning and 
operations, later discussed the project plan of the ship with WestCoat. 
Figure 14 illustrates the tasks for the participants involved in planning, coordinating, 
supervising and performing WestCoat tasks in Ulstein project. The project planners at 
Ulstein Shipyard set up a proposal plan for the painting work followed by verifying and 
setting dates for the plans proposed by the leading coordinator at the shipyard. Subsequently, 
the project planners distributed the plan to all the production coordinators at the shipyard 
and asked them for their feedback on the proposal in order to either confirm or modify it. 
                                                 




Figure 14: Current tasks & information flow between Ulstein Shipyard and WestCoat. 
Source: Retrieved from Ulstein Shipyard planning department (Personal communication, March 25, 2015).2 
  
This stage is followed by setting up of an internal discipline control through the help of a 
Synergi system. Ulstein Shipyard used the Synergi system to monitor WestCoat deviations 
between the settled plan tasks and the actual execution of those tasks. Alongside, it used a 
key performance indicator, called the “healthy seven”, in the outfitting phase. This key 
performance indicator covered several elements such as: tools, documentation, resources, 
areas, previous work, material and causes.  
The function of the “healthy seven” was to track and understand which of its elements caused 
the project plan deviations. Ulstein Shipyard controlled WestCoat’s tasks in the ship by 
using the Synergi system and the key performance indicator.  
                                                 
2 An interview and personal communication with the Ulstein Shipyard planning department, March 24, 2015. 
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According to respondent from Ulstein planning department (personal communication, 
March 25, 2015) 3 each work discipline in the shipyard had a production coordinator 
responsible for verifying the proposed plans from the project planners, giving the planners 
feedback about the plans before confirming them and managing the plan tasks with the 
corresponding supplier.  
4.2 Outfitting phase:  
After the project plans for sandblasting, treating and painting had been settled, WestCoat 
was not involved in remaining project phases until the aft-ship had arrived at the Ulstein hull 
yard. Then, WestCoat came in again in the outfitting phase. In this phase, WestCoat was 
largely involved and participated in the weekly meetings with other work disciplines. 
According to Ulstein planning department (Personal communication, March 25, 2015) 4 all 
weekly meeting participants such as: the shipyard’s project planner and the leading/project 
coordinator, WestCoat project supervisors (or foreman in Ulstein Shipyard’s terms) from 
different disciplines and other subcontractors- gathered with one perspective in the Synergi 
system, and the participants came up with an agreement about weekly dates and activities. 
Moreover, it has been stated that the suppliers attended weekly meetings with their own 
supervisor (foreman) in the outfitting phase. They went through the previous week’s plan to 
check if they followed the schedule from the previous week’s meeting, and modified the 
current plan in case of delays from the previous week. Additionally, the project coordinators 
from Ulstein Shipyard attended weekly meetings without being prepared about the issues 
they were supposed to discuss during the meeting with adequate preparations. On the 
contrary, WestCoat management (personal communication, March 24, 2015)5 stated that the 
last planner tool which used during the weekly meeting to control and monitor the execution 
of the project plan tasks was not utilized efficiently, primarily because of lack of the project 
plan commitments and giving inaccurate feedback from Ulstein planning department. 
After this weekly meeting, the project plan for WestCoat tasks was preliminary settled and 
the project plan considered “alive”. On the contrary, there was another periodical meeting 
for the whole project (mentioned in figure 14), including all the concerned departments and 
staff from Ulstein Shipyard. Generally, this periodical meeting takes place every 6/8 weeks, 
where Ulstein’s project manager, project planners, leading coordinator, all the production 
                                                 
3 An interview and personal communication with Ulstein planning department, March 25, 2015. 
4 An interview and personal communication with Ulstein planning department, March 25, 2015. 
5 An interview and personal communications with WestCoat management, March 24, 2015. 
 55 
coordinator and technical departments attends. Meanwhile, Ulstein’s suppliers were not 
attending on this periodical meeting as showed in figure 15, but their coordinators from 
Ulstein Shipyard attends.  
In the periodical project meeting, they discuss and make plans for the next six or eight weeks 
accompanied by the weekly plans. The material de-coupling point comes at this phase where 
Ulstein Shipyard supplies WestCoat with the required material to conduct their tasks. Each 
task in the outfitting phase took place according to the shipyard’s project plan; WestCoat 
started its tasks of sandblasting, treating and painting several steel blocks, units, tanks, areas 
and rooms once the aft-ship had arrived at the hull yard. After WestCoat finished one task, 
other suppliers started their assigned tasks in the outfitting phase. For instance, the WestCoat 
task of painting the engine room was followed by another supplier installing pipes and pipes 
supporters. One respondent from Ulstein Shipyard (personal communication, March 25, 
2015) 6 stated that the causes of the problems in the outfitting phase occurred for several 
reasons. First and second reasons occurred within Ulstein Shipyard (the shipyard could 
control it), the other reasons occurred externally (the shipyard could not control it).  
4.2.1 Problems in the project outfitting phase: 
Reasons for the problems in the project outfitting phase have been observed and investigated 
from two perspectives, namely Ulstein Shipyard and WestCoat. The following section 
shows those perspectives respectively:  
4.2.1.1 Ulstein Shipyard perspective  
4.2.1.1.1 First reason  
The first was a lack of vision on the part of the Ulstein Shipyard project planner about the 
inter-dependencies between its suppliers when they executed their project plan tasks. The 
planners did not take into account the inter-dependencies when creating the project plan. 
Those inter-dependencies caused deviations and delays.  
Ulstein’s respondent described the situation through different examples. First, when 
WestCoat finished its assigned tasks in the engine room, another supplier installed the pipes 
and the supporters to hold up the pipes in the engine room. Installing the supporters required 
welding them to the floor of the engine room which caused burning marks that damaged the 
painting of the tanks that located under the engine room. Therefore, the finished work on 
those tanks had to be repeated. Subsequently, the project plan time to finish this task 
                                                 
6 An interview and personal communication with Ulstein Shipyard respondent, March 25, 2015. 
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increased significantly, additionally causing a monitoring problem in the Synergi system. In 
the feedback, the project coordinator said that the tasks were complete but they weren’t.  
4.2.1.1.2 Second reason  
After WestCoat finished its tasks in the cargo room, it found out that it had yet to install steel 
parts on the walls of some areas in the cargo room for use as equipment holders (fire 
extinguishers). These necessary steel works damaged the painting of the cargo room, and, 
therefore, WestCoat had to partially repeat its tasks in the cargo room. Those real examples 
of inter-dependencies, between the suppliers while they were performing their tasks, gave 
an exploratory notion about the nature of wastes that occurred during the outfitting phase. 
Those wastes were:  
1) Waste of time:  Waste of time created a deviation in the project plan tasks and extended 
the lead-time to finish the assigned tasks.  
2) Waste of material: Repeating the assigned tasks and using additional material in the tasks 
already done. 
3) Another kind of waste: This caused by extra cleaning services carried out due to the 
repetition of the assigned tasks done before. 
Additionally, the inter-dependencies negatively influenced the execution of the next 
assigned tasks in the project plan.  
4.2.1.1.3 Third reason  
The execution of the project plan tasks stopped due to unfavorable weather conditions. 
Weather conditions affected the execution of some tasks in the project plan (i.e. the painting 
task) causing deviations and delays. 
The workers stopped their painting task when it was raining and when the humidity was 
higher than 85 degree. One respondent from Ulstein Shipyard claimed that the planning 
department was not successful to consider these unfavorable weather conditions although it 
was the unit’s responsibility to do so during the creation of the plan.  
4.2.1.1.4 Forth reason  
The overall pipes and other ship installments became more complicated in the current times 
compared to five years ago.  
4.2.1.1.5 Fifth reason  
There was a serious communication gap as a result of language barriers (i.e. Romanians and 
Polish workers), causing misunderstandings and delays in the execution of the assigned 
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tasks. This communication gap took place when the shipyard’s project coordinator asked 
WestCoat workers to perform certain tasks according to the project plan. Later, when the 
coordinator carried out an inspection for WestCoat’s workers to check if they had finished 
their tasks, he found out that they were incomplete due to misunderstandings and language 
barriers. 
Therefore, Ulstein Shipyard and WestCoat conducted weekly meetings to monitor and solve 
the problems and deficiencies arising from such inter-dependencies.  They then modified 
the plan for the following week to shift the delays that could affect other assigned tasks in 
the project plan.  
4.2.1.2 WestCoat perspective 
WestCoat as mentioned, was paid a fixed per-square-meter price for the finished work along 
with an hourly price for the rework resulting from other suppliers. In case of the delays 
caused by other suppliers, that prevented WestCoat to start its planned task in one area, 
WestCoat shifted its workers to execute another task in a different area until the other 
suppliers had finished their work.   
It has been claimed by WestCoat’s respondent that the supplier did not profit when it had to 
re-execute tasks as a result of other suppliers. On the contrary, one respondent from Ulstein 
planning department (Personal communication, January 21, 2015)7 mentioned that it was 
profitable for the suppliers to re-execute tasks. Therefore, WestCoat claims about non-
profitability contradicted with Ulstein Shipyard’s perception. 
Moreover, it has been stated by one respondent from WestCoat management (personal 
communication, March 24, 2015)8 that its performance level in tasks such as sandblasting, 
treating and painting was not the same compared to the level five years ago for the following 
reasons:  
4.2.1.2.1 First reason  
The project plan from the shipyard regarding WestCoat’s painting tasks was not transparent 
and mismatched with contract agreements in certain circumstances.  
4.2.1.2.2 Second reason  
Controlling and monitoring WestCoat’s tasks by the shipyard were not precise or accurate 
due to the lack of information flow integration between both sides.  
                                                 
7 An interview and personal communication with Ulstein planning department, March 25, 2015. 
8 An interview and personal communications with WestCoat management, March 24, 2015. 
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4.2.1.2.3 Third reason  
Ulstein Shipyard’s assigned unplanned tasks to WestCoat were not included in their 
contract.  
4.2.1.2.4 Forth reason  
WestCoat was considered neither an internal nor an external part of the shipyard. 
4.2.1.2.5 Fifth reason  
WestCoat used 15 percent additional workforce to cover the deviations from the project 
plan. Consequently, the total cost of workers increased by 5-10percent. In addition, the extra 
workers were not highly skilled and efficient enough compared to the original workers. 
Therefore, there were variations in both the number of workers and their performance in the 
assigned tasks, and their efficiency in using the material to perform those tasks.    
4.2.2 Information flow in the outfitting phase: 
It has been demonstrated by one respondent from Ulstein Shipyard that the information flow 
regarding the requirements of WestCoat’s tasks started from WestCoat workers and went 
through its supervisors (foremen in Ulstein’s terms) to the Ulstein Shipyard project 
coordinator and was finally delivered to the Ulstein Shipyard project planner ( figure 15). 
It was thought by Ulstein Shipyard respondent that it was not an efficient way to transfer the 
information regarding the project plan task requirements. Ulstein Shipyard’s respondent 
recommended that it would be more efficient if the planners physically observed the work 
site (outfitting phase) to understand the inter-dependencies between the suppliers regarding 
performing their tasks, the requirements of the supplier’s tasks and the chronological 
arrangement of the suppliers tasks in the project plan.  
4.2.2.1 Causes of information flow gap in the outfitting phase 
Ulstein Shipyard uses the Synergi system to plan, execute, and monitor the project plan 
tasks, while WestCoat doesn’t use the same system to handle its work tasks. Therefore, there 
was an information flow gap, which caused misunderstandings, wrong orders and a lack of 
transparency. One respondent from Ulstein Shipyard’s planning department clarified that 
WestCoat was not using the same operating system as the shipyard. The main reason was 
the high investment costs involved in purchasing and installing Synergi system into 
WestCoat. Ulstein planning department demonstrated how giving WestCoat access to 
Ulstein Shipyard’s Synergi system would facilitate a smooth information flow between 
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them, but the opportunity was not used owing to confidentiality issues and the fact that no 
one from WestCoat requested permission to access the shipyard’s Synergi system.  
It was believed by Ulstein management that there was no need to give WestCoat this 
accessibility to Synergi system because the shipyard had other suppliers carrying out 
painting alongside WestCoat. Ulstein management believed that by granting WestCoat the 
accessibility, it would make the relationship between the supplier and the shipyard more 
fundamental and tied. Eventually, this would contradict with the shipyard’s policy of 
depending on many suppliers to perform the painting tasks instead of being tied to one. 
Ulstein Shipyard used several suppliers to perform the painting tasks in its projects in order 
to maintain competition between the suppliers. Figure 15 explains the information flow 
between Ulstein Shipyard and WestCoat systems.  
 
Figure 15: Current information flow between Ulstein Shipyard & WestCoat systems 
Source: Retrieved from Ulstein Shipyard & WestCoat managements (2015). 
 
One respondent from WestCoat management (personal communication, March 24, 2015)9 
stated that the current information flow between Ulstein Shipyard and the supplier created a 
communication gap and lack of transparency regarding the efficient execution and 
monitoring of the project plan. 
On the other side, respondent from Ulstein Shipyard’s planning department (Personal 
communication, March 25, 2015)10 clarified that Ulstein Shipyard were not fully committed 
to fulfilling WestCoat’s project plan tasks on time. Ulstein Shipyard gave inaccurate 
feedback on the Synergi monitoring system about the completion of WestCoat’s tasks in the 
project plan. Moreover, they justified giving inaccurate feedback on Synergi monitoring 
                                                 
9 An interview and personal communication with WestCoat management, March 25, 2015. 
10 An interview and personal communication with Ulstein Shipyard planning department, March 25, 2015. 
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system that the tasks required flexibility and needed to be adjusted often due to unexpected 
delays arising from other tasks in the plan.  
4.3 Testing phase: 
The testing phase that follows the outfitting phase, as Figure 12 showed, is where all the 
project plan tasks on the project have to be complete and ready to be tested. One respondent 
from Ulstein Shipyard’s planning department (Personal communication, March 25, 2015)11 
stated that the plan tasks on the ship were completed on schedule due to the rework. Besides, 
there were many delays in starting the testing phase because of the unexpected task delays 
as a result of the weather conditions.  
4.4 Project evaluation phase: 
After the required tests were conducted on the ship, it returned to the shipyard so that any 
observed malfunctions could be fixed or any unfinished tasks could be completed by the 
suppliers. The ship was then delivered to the customer followed by the next phase—as 
explained in figure 14— the project evaluation phase. In this phase, Ulstein Shipyard invited 
all the involved disciplines in the project to discuss about their performance in the project 
and to figure out how cooperation between the different disciplines took place. It has been 
mentioned by one respondent from Ulstein Shipyard planning department that WestCoat 
was not involved in the project evaluation phase but its coordinator from the shipyard 
attended. 
4.5 The warranty and aftermarket services phase: 
 In the final, warranty and aftermarket services phase, WestCoat provided the necessary 
repairs and maintenance works for the ship. WestCoat checked the tasks’ capacity before 
offering the warranty and aftermarket services in order to avoid any overcapacity or 
overlapping while performing the current tasks. 
4.6 WestCoat Process flow: 
The process flow of WestCoat started with the sandblasting and painting of different steel 
blocks and units once the aft-ship arrived at Ulstein’s hull yard. Later, when the aft-ship 
arrived at the inner dock in the shipyard, the supplier continued its process flow by 
sandblasting and painting several tanks, areas and rooms. 
                                                 
11 An interview and personal communication with Ulstein Shipyard planning department, March 25, 2015. 
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Painting tanks was the most expensive work for WestCoat. Additionally, it sandblasted and 
painted the remaining steel blocks and units that were not done at the hull yard. WestCoat’s 
process flow is summarized, as explained in Figure 16, based on the consecutive tasks in the 
project plan.  
The painting tasks in the project plan were controlled by Ulstein Shipyard, followed by the 
inclusion of WestCoat and the customer in the control process.     
  
 
Figure 16: WestCoat process flow. 
Source: Retrieved from Ulstein Shipyard Synergi system (2015).  
 
4.7 Surface treatment by WestCoat: 
 
Figure 17: Surface treatment by WestCoat. 
Source: Retrieved from Ulstein Synergi system(2015).  
 
WestCoat’s activities in the ship took place according to the following consecutive tasks: 
1) Installing pipes, fundamentals and cable trays: When Ulstein Shipyard checked the 
quality of the delivered pipes, WestCoat continued its blasting tasks and applied the 
primer. Later, other operators performed the mounting and welding tasks. Then, 
WestCoat performed the required grinding task before Ulstein Shipyard conducted its 























2) Section blasting: When the approval of the steel inspection by Ulstein Shipyard was 
done, WestCoat sandblasted and performed a salt test on the steel blocks and units. Then, 
it cleaned the blast and applied the primer before painting the first layer.  
3) Tank/WB tank: After, the approval of the steel inspection by Ulstein Shipyard, WestCoat 
washed, dried, performed a salt test and cleaned the blast before Ulstein Shipyard 
conducted an inspection. Afterwards, there were probable rework by Ulstein Shipyard 
and WestCoat concerning re-blasting and cleaning before the shipyard conducted 
another inspection. 
Then, WestCoat painted and dried the first layer, and applied and dried two layers of 
stripe coating. It then painted a second layer and may have painted a third layer also on 
the MIS tank before performing quality control. Ulstein Shipyard performed the final 
paint inspection to check if it needed any rework before conducting the final inspection 
of the tank. This final inspection was performed before closing. 
4) Hull outside: Consequently, after the approval of the steel inspection by Ulstein 
Shipyard, WestCoat ground, washed and performed a salt test, and cleaned the hull 
outside before Ulstein Shipyard inspected it. WestCoat then applied the first layer of 
stripe coating and covered it with plastic. It then painted the first layer and applied a 
second layer of stripe coating and painted it. Subsequently, it conducted quality control 
before Ulstein Shipyard performed the final paint inspection. Generally, a rework is 
possible before the shipyard’s final paint inspection of the vessel. 
5) Inside interior & behind lining: After the approval of steel inspection by Ulstein 
Shipyard, WestCoat applied a single-coat primer and cleaned it. It then painted the goods 
in the cold zone and dried it after finishing. Finally, the shipyard performed its inspection 
before insulation. 
6) Hull inside: After the approval of steel inspection by Ulstein Shipyard, WestCoat 
repaired the grindings from the stripe coating. It covered, washed and removed the 
covers inside the hull. Later, WestCoat redid certain works (i.e., washing, cleaning and 
covering of equipment) to fulfill Ulstein Shipyard’s inspection criteria.  
Subsequently, WestCoat applied and dried a layer of stripe coating, a primer and another 
layer of stripe coating. It removed the covers and cleaned before conducting quality 
control. Eventually, Ulstein Shipyard conducted a final paint inspection to figure out if 
there was any possibility of rework inside the hull. 
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7) After final paint work: WestCoat checked for burn marks. In case it found any, it ground, 
washed, cleaned and painted the areas according to the specifications of thickness and 
dry time. Afterwards, Ulstein Shipyard conducted the final paint inspection for the ship. 
4.8 Case findings Summary 
The following tables 6&7 summarized the case study findings in this chapter. Table 6 
summarized the case findings from Ulstein Shipyard across the project phases followed by 
table 7 which summarized the findings from WestCoat across the project phases. 
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rather than core 
function. 
3- Mismatches 
between the projects 
planned tasks and 
the requirements to 
conduct those tasks. 
4- Project planners 
were not attached 
physically on site to 
observe the realities 
and requirements of 
the project tasks.  
1- Supplies WestCoat with 
the required material to 
conduct their tasks. 
2-Inefficient information 
flow from WestCoat’s 
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execution of the project 
tasks. 
4- Assigning extra working 
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mentioned in the contract 
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5-Inefficient monitoring of 
the project tasks. 
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to language barriers. 
7- Ship installments 
became more complicated 
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price for the 
finished work 
and an hourly 
price for the 
reworks which 
caused by other 
suppliers. 
 
1- Confirmed the 
number of square 
meters that were 
required to work 
on Ulstein project 
according to the 
design sketches. 
 
1- Lack of transparency 
regarding Ulstein project 
plan. 
2- Gap of information flow 
due to using different 
operating systems. 
3- Conducting tasks that 
were not exist in the 
contract agreement with 
Ulstein Shipyard. 
4- Conducting reworks 
due to inter-dependencies 
with other suppliers during 
executing the project 
tasks.  
5- Hiring extra workforce 
to cover the time 
deviations on the project 
plan.  
1- WestCoat was 
not involved in the 
testing and project 
evaluation phases. 
1- Provides the 
necessary repairs 
and maintenance 
services for the 
project after 




5.0 Discussion and Analysis 
Chapter 5 discusses the relevant theory presented in chapter 3 and the associated findings 
from the case study in the previous chapter. 
SMART prod is running the project on the basis of finding the scope for compressing the 
TCT of ship manufacturing. 
Towill (2008) argued in the Construction Supply Chain and Time Compression Paradigm 
handbook that the TCT compression paradigm can be simply expressed as “the principle of 
reducing the time taken to execute a business process from perception of customer need to 
the satisfying of the need. 
With this scope and based on its findings, the broader or general objective of the 
SMARTProd project is to compress the TCT through different tasks and activities under the 
ETO environment. A part of this task is to integrate the supplier value stream. 
In the previous chapter it is described about the TCT of ship building where the task is started 
from the presale phase and finishes with the delivery to the customer, briefly with warranty 
services if requires. As the focused research questions deal with compressing the TCT in the 
production networks in Ulstein Shipyard, the scope of the research is narrowed by focusing 
on the outfitting phase as it is the main phase in which value is added. In this phase, the 
focus was mainly on the aft-ship part of the Ulstein project as it was the most time 
consuming, labor-dependent and complex part of total ship manufacturing. Most of the 
installations of the manufacturing process take place were in this part of the ship. Here, the 
further focus was on a key supplier called WestCoat who performed the sandblasting, 
treating and painting tasks.   
Based on Chapter 2, the first research question follows: 
5.1 Research Question 1 
How to compress the TCT in Ulstein Shipyard’s ETO production networks? 
According to Hui (2004), the reduction of cycle times is considered one of the primary 
objectives of time compression. Based on the case study findings from Chapter 4, it was 
clear that there were many deviations on the project plan across the whole production 




5.1.1 Analysis for the production networks in Ulstein project  
 The following Figure 18 displays the main schedule across several production networks in 
the shipyard during the manufacturing of the ship. 
 
Figure 18: Main schedule across several production networks in Ulstein Shipyard. 
Source: Retrieved from Ulstein Shipyard’s Synergi system (2015).  
 
Based on figure 18, significant deviations have been found between planned and actual 
duration of different activities that took place in shipyard’s production networks. This ended 
up with table 8 and figure 19. These show significant deviations along with potential areas 
where time reduction improvements could have been achieved. 
 
Table 8: Deviations analysis on main schedule in ULSTEIN SX 121. 






Figure 19: Deviation analysis on main schedule in ULSTEIN SX 121.  
Source: Retrieved from Ulstein’s shipyard Synergi system (2015). 
 
The previous figures 18 & 19 show deviations across the production networks in Ulstein 
Shipyard during the manufacturing of the Ulstein SX 121 subsea ship. Associated deviations 
from the whole production networks were found alongside with delivering Ulstein SX 121 
subsea ship on time to the customer. This indicates that Ulstein Shipyard was successful to 
deliver the project on time through hiring extra workers by suppliers to recover the wastes 
of reworks and repairs by paying extra cost to execute the project tasks. Meanwhile, Ulstein 
Shipyard was not successful to fulfil the planned time across the project production 
networks.   
Therefore, it was believed that time reduction in TCT is possible by removing those 
associated deviations from the production networks in Ulstein Shipyard. The criteria to 
remove the time deviations across all production networks are vast, too broad and require 
intensive research with longer time frame than the current master’s thesis duration. 
Therefore, decisions were made among authors, Ulstein Shipyard and Molde Research 
Centre to narrow down the scope of the time compression analysis in the given scope of this 
thesis. Thus the scope of the analysis has been narrowed down to the outfitting phase as it is 
the main phase in which value was added. 
  
 68 
5.1.2 Outfitting phase analysis  
Subsequently, there was focus on answering the first research question of how to compress 
the TCT in Ulstein Shipyard’s ETO production networks.  
The research analysis was carried out on several tasks of the phase. Figures 20 and 21 show 
deviations of tasks taken place in the outfitting phase in terms of start and end dates. 
Naturally, these deviations indicate a weak execution of project planning with the 
subsequent waste of time along with flawed or misappropriate tasks done by the suppliers 
before WestCoat. This waste of time due to the inter-dependencies deviates the Ulstein 
Shipyard project from the principles of lean construction. The principles, according to 
Koskela (2000), are presented below. 
1. Meeting the requirements of the customer  
2. Reducing non-value adding activities  
3. Reducing cycle time  
4. Reducing variability  
5. Increasing flexibility  




Figure 20: Planned start dates versus actual start dates for outfitting phase tasks. 
































































































































































Planned start dates vs. Actual start dates
(Ulstein SX121 subsea ship / outfitting phase tasks)
Planned start Actual start
 69 
 
Figure 21: Planned end dates versus actual end dates for outfitting phase tasks. 
Source: Retrieved from Ulstein Shipyard’s Synergi system (2015). 
 
From the case study findings in chapter 4 and the previous outfitting phase analysis in 
Figures 20 and 21, it has been found that Ulstein Shipyard prioritized the first principle of 
the lean construction principles, which is meeting the requirements of the customer by 
delivering the project on time. The other principles of lean construction, such as reducing 
non-value added activities and reducing the cycle time, were not properly achieved. Figures 
20 and 21 have an evidential base that the waste of time and deviations occurred, causing 
obstacles in the production process flow. Therefore, those inter-dependencies create a chain 
of subsequent delays, affecting the primary objective of reducing the outfitting phase cycle 
time.  
Koskela (2000) states that in general, the lean construction principles apply both to the total 
flow process and to its sub-processes. In addition, the principles implicitly define flow 
process problems, such as complexity, lack of transparency or segmented control.  
It is also necessary to emphasize that lean is about developing and customizing principles 
that are right for each specific organization and diligently practicing them to achieve high 
performance that continues to add value to customers and society (Liker, 2004). 
However, investigating all these outfitting tasks were also a vast job. Therefore, with the 
alignment of Molde Research Centre and Ulstein Shipyard, it has been decided to focus the 











































































































































































































Planned end dates vs. Atcual end dates
(Ulstein SX121 supsea ship / outfitting phase tasks)
Planned End Actual End
 70 
5.1.3 Analysis of WestCoat tasks in the project outfitting phase  
As mentioned before in the case study findings in chapter 4, each task in the outfitting phase 
took place according to the shipyard project plan. WestCoat began its tasks from 
sandblasting, treating and painting several steel blocks, units, tanks, areas and rooms once 
the aft-ship arrived at the Ulstein hull yard. After WestCoat finished its work on one task, 
another supplier started its assigned tasks in the outfitting phase.  
Based on data and general expectations retrieved from Ulstein Shipyard’s Synergi system 
and WestCoat excel sheets for the painting task, staffing plans and working hours, there 
were obvious deviations between WestCoat planned tasks and actual execution of those 
tasks in the outfitting phase. Table 9 displays WestCoat extra working hours that occurred 
due to painting plan deviations in the outfitting phase.  
 
Table 9: Extra hours occurring due to painting plan deviations. 
Source: Retrieved from Ulstein Synergi system performance report (2015). 
 
Activity test Hours 
Repairs of pre-painted areas 854 
Tank repairs 331 




Afterwards, table 10 shows that the project profitability was five percent of the selling price 
which range between 750million NOK and 1.2 billion NOK. This means, the project 
profitability was 37.5 million-60 million NOK.  
Alongside these findings, the total number and rate of extra working hours were obtained 
from Ulstein Shipyard Synergi system. The extra working hours were 2,321 and the rate for 
each extra working hour was 340 NOK. Therefore, the cost of the total extra hours at Ulstein 






Table 10: ULSTEIN SX 121 project profitability. 
Source: Retrieved from general expectations of Ulstein Shipyard management and Synergi system.  
 
Selling price 750-1200 million NOK 
Profitability % 5% of the selling price 
Profitability in NOKs 37.5-60 million NOK 
Number of extra hours 2321hours 
Rate of extra hour 340 NOK/hour 
Total cost of extra hours 789140 NOK 
Extra hours cost % 




A further analysis of WestCoat’s painting plan deviations have been provided. Those 
deviations were as follows:  
5.1.3.1 Units painting:  
 
Table 11: Units painting task (planned and actual time required). 
Source: Retrieved from Ulstein Shipyard’s Synergi system (2015). 
 
 
The planned time to conduct the units’ painting task for the aft-ship in the inner dock was 
12 days while the actual required time was nine days. As displayed in Table 11, there was 
no delay in painting the units, but the logs shows that the painting of the unit’s task was 
completed three days ahead of schedule.  
5.1.3.2 Painting tanks 
The tank painting task was the most intensive task done by WestCoat. Based on the case 
study findings from chapter 4, there were inter-dependencies while performing the task in 
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several rooms and tanks. Those inter-dependencies caused delays that deviated the execution 
of the project plan. Figure 22 and 23 display those deviations.  
 
 
Figure 22: Planned start dates versus actual start dates for tank painting task. 
Source: Retrieved from Ulstein Shipyard’s Synergi system (2015). 
 
Figure 22 displays the deviations of the planned start dates from the actual start dates for 
painting the tanks. 
 
 
Figure 23: Planned end dates versus actual end dates for tank painting task. 














Planned start dates vs. Actual start dates











































































































































































Planned end dates vs. Actual end dates
(Ulstein SX121 subsea ship/ painting tanks task) 
Planned end Actual End
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Meanwhile, figure 23 displays the deviations of the planned end dates from the actual end 
dates for the same task.  
Accordingly, in figures 22 and 23, a similar evidence base of waste of time and deviations 
occurring in the painting tasks of WestCoat activities were found. This hindered the flow of 
the production process in the same manner as in the outfitting phase. Therefore, these inter-
dependencies by different suppliers working in the outfitting phase create accumulated 
redundancies in overall project plan execution in the outfitting phase.  
5.1.3.3 Painting rooms and areas:  
According to Figures 24 and 25, the project plan deviations in painting rooms and areas were 
not as much as the project plan deviations in painting tanks. Based on the case study findings 
from chapter 4, there were inter-dependencies in preforming the painting tasks in the rooms 
and areas from one side and painting the tanks from the other side. Performing the painting 
task alongside with necessary installments in the areas and rooms causes more damage to 
the painted tanks. Consequently, there were more rework requirements in repainting the 
tanks. Therefore, there were fewer deviations while painting the areas and rooms than 
painting the tanks. Figures 24 and 25 displays those deviations that took place due to the 




Figure 24: Planned start dates versus actual start dates for rooms and areas painting task. 




































































































































































































Planned start dates vs. Actual start dates
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 74 
Figure 24 displays the deviations of the planned start dates from the actual start dates for the 
same task.  
 
 
Figure 25: Planned end dates versus actual end dates for rooms and areas painting task. 
Source: Retrieved from Ulstein Shipyard’s Synergi system (2015). 
 
Meanwhile, figure 25 displays the deviations of the planned end dates from the actual end 
dates for the same task. 
5.1.3.4 WestCoat staffing plan and Working Hours: 
Variations in the staffing plan and working hours in WestCoat to execute the project plan 
tasks were influenced by the deviations in the project plan on the Ulstein Shipyard Synergi 
system.   
Figures 26 and 27, and Tables 12 and13 show the variations in the seven-month staffing and 
working hour plans for WestCoat on Ulstein project (Ulstein SX121 subsea ship). WestCoat 
started to execute its tasks in the outfitting phase in November 2013 and finished its final 
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Figure 26: WestCoat staffing plan (2014) for ULSTEIN SX 121 project. 
Source: Retrieved from WestCoat staffing plan Excel sheets for ULSTEIN SX 121 project (2014). 
 
 
Table 12: WestCoat staffing plan (2014) for ULSTEIN SX 121 project.  















WestCoat Staffing plan 35 35 38 38 38 28 5 
WestCoat Staffing actual 30 31 37 50 48 18 7 
 
As displayed in figure 26 and table 12, a significant variations have been observed in 
WestCoat’s staffing plan in the months of April and May, in which the final painting task in 
the outfitting phase was executed. WestCoat’s staffing plan in those months included 38 
workers for each month, while the actual staffing required was 50 workers for April and 48 
for May.  
Moreover, in Figure 27 and Table 13, a significant variations have been observed in 
WestCoat’s working hours plan in the months of April and May, in which the task of 
conducting the final painting in the outfitting phase was executed. WestCoat’s working hours 
plan -based on the Ulstein Shipyard plan- in the two months were 8,050 hours for each 
























WestCoat AS staffing plan (2014) 
for ULSTEIN SX121 project
WestCoat Staffing plan WestCoat Staffing actual
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Figure 27: Working hours plan (2014) for ULSTEIN SX 121 project. 
Source: Retrieved from WestCoat staffing plan Excel sheets for ULSTEIN SX 121 project (2014). 
 
Table 13: Working hours plan (2014) for ULSTEIN SX121 project. 















Ulstein total hours plan  7500 7500 8050 8050 8050 6000 1000 
Actual production hours 
& reworks 
6767 6798 7895 10776 9684 3958 1596 
 
Based on the previous analysis of WestCoat’s painting tasks in the outfitting phase, it is 
believed that there are potential opportunities for Ulstein Shipyard to compress the TCT and 
increase its project profitability across the project phases.   
The evidential base for this belief was emanated from the case study findings regarding the 
project plan deviations. Moreover, it has been found that the deviations were taking place in 
all the project phases as mentioned in table 8 and figure 19. Therefore, generalizing the 
findings from the outfitting phase to the other project phases, the scope for compressing the 
TCT will be created alongside robust opportunities to increase its project profitability.      
In summary, the analysis for the first research question follows. 
Generally, Ulstein Shipyard needs to compress the TCT of the overall project phases. The 
example of one supplier, WestCoat, can be taken as a model example to generalize with 
other supplier tasks. While thinking of ways to compress the TCT, the underlying primary 






















Working hours plan (2014)
for ULSTEIN SX121 project
Ulstein total hours plan Actual production hours & reworks
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nature of the relationship between Ulstein Shipyard as a buyer and WestCoat as a supplier. 
The shipyard keeps an arm’s length relationship with the supplier. Moreover, Ulstein 
Shipyard adopts a competitive policy towards its suppliers. The second cause was inefficient 
planning of the project that did not correspond with the realities and requirements of the 
working tasks across the project phases. Consequently, it was found that this cause was 
embedded in the project planning process. The process of planning the project was changed 
recently. Five years ago, project planners used to visit the shipyard frequently and 
meticulously observed the activities, realities and requirements to perform the working 
tasks. By being present in person, project planners used to pinpoint the crucial realities and 
requirements.  
Currently, the situation has changed significantly. Nowadays, planners are asked to propose 
project plans based on previous plans instead of having more on-the-job experience in the 
realities and requirements. Additionally, planning department tasks were partially shifted to 
the project coordinator responsible for conducting the planning tasks alongside with his 
specific tasks. 
In other words, the project planners believe that planning has become a support function 
instead of being the main contributing function in the shipyard. Moreover, the planners think 
that they are just doers of the plans but not responsible to take decisions or being responsible 
for deciding either how the plans should be executed and how long each task in the project 
plan should take. 
All these factors create obstacles in efforts to compressing the TCT of the project.  
The first question of how to compress the TCT in Ulstein Shipyard’s ETO production 
networks?” leads to the need to integrate WestCoat’s value stream with that of Ulstein 
Shipyard. The integrated value stream will include only the value adding activities. 
Consequently, it was believed that there would be scope for TCT compression by removing 
waste and non-value adding activities from the integrated stream. Therefore, a second 






5.2 Research Question 2  
How to integrate a supplier’s value stream into that of Ulstein Shipyard? What are the 
obstacles and benefits?  
One of the most significant parts of this thesis is the integration of the supplier into the 
buyer’s production networks. However, integration is a broad terminology. Thus, the 
integration of WestCoat’s value stream into that of Ulstein Shipyard has been focused. While 
integrating, a general discussion on supply chain integration and buyer-supplier relationship 
based on Ulstein Shipyard and WestCoat is required.  
5.2.1 Supply Chain Integration  
According to Lambert et al. (1998) the goal of supply chain integration is to enhance total 
process efficiency and effectiveness across members of the supply chain. From a strategic 
perspective, Ajmera and Cook (2009) described supply chain integration as partners with 
joint authority that will share resources, benefits and risks. Similarly, supply chain 
integration is sometimes interpreted as high-level collaboration, where the involved parties 
act as one entity within an extended enterprise (Wen et al. 2007).  
Based on the case study findings from chapter 4, it has been found that Ulstein Shipyard 
shared resources, benefits and risks with WestCoat, but the goal of supply chain integration 
was not achieved due to unwillingness on the part of the Ulstein Shipyard management to 
integrate WestCoat. The shipyard’s management strategy is to maintain the competitiveness 
between the suppliers that perform the painting tasks instead of being dependent on one 
supplier.  
Therefore, Ulstein Shipyard avoids a complete integration of WestCoat into its supply chain. 
Consequently, the total process efficiency and effectiveness across members of the supply 
chain could not be achieved. Moreover, the lack of integration deprives the companies of its 
potential benefits such as adding expertise, identifying problems as well as solutions ahead 
of time, and improving communication and information exchange regarding new ideas and 
technologies into each partner’s system. The evidence of not achieving these potential 
benefits was found in the dissimilarities of the systems (i.e., Synergi and Microsoft Excel) 
used by Ulstein Shipyard and WestCoat. The dissimilarities of using different systems create 
obstacles in integrating the information flow, and hinder an increase in transparency among 
the members of the supply chain. 
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5.2.2 Buyer Supplier relationship 
Park et al., (2012) mentioned that the terms such as outsourcing, downsizing, streamlining 
suppliers, and forming strategic partnerships with suppliers have become part of today’s 
business jargon. They reflect changes in shipbuilding practices. Streamlining suppliers and 
forming strategic partnerships with suppliers means that Ulstein Shipyard and WestCoat are 
involved in relational exchanges rather than spot market exchanges.  
Based on the case study findings, it has been observed that Ulstein Shipyard is taking an 
advantage of its post-contract bargaining power over WestCoat by assigning different 
number of workers and working hours to execute the project plan tasks. Ulstein Shipyard 
keeps an arm’s length relationship with WestCoat rather than making them an integral part 
of its production networks.  
While they are involved in transactions, Ulstein Shipyard safeguards itself against the 
hazards of opportunism from its suppliers by keeping an arm’s length relationship with them 
to avoid any risk of copying its know-how in shipbuilding and delivers ships on time. Thus, 
the repeated transactions between Ulstein Shipyard and WestCoat for years did not help 
increase inter-organizational trust. 
5.2.3 Relational Norms and Dependence 
Relational norms may be described as the values shared among exchange partners regarding 
what is deemed appropriate behavior in a relationship (for example, Heide and John, 1992). 
Over the last two decades, closer supply chain relationships exhibited by high relational 
norms — such as trust, collaboration, long-term relationship, and increased information 
sharing—have evolved in many industries to help firms respond to changes (Droge and 
Germain, 2000; Hoetker et al, 2007; Monczka et al, 1998; Sengün and Wasti, 2007; Whipple 
and Frankel, 2000).  
Based on the case study findings and observations about the relationship between Ulstein 
Shipyard and WestCoat, it was found that there were low relational norms characterized by 
distributive or aggressive bargaining behaviors as a part of which tactics where used to 
resolve disagreements. The evidential base for the low relational norm between Ulstein 
Shipyard and WestCoat was stated by one respondent from shipyard. Low relational norms 
tend to be arm's length or competitive, he added. 
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5.2.4 Governance forms: 
One method to analyze suppliers and finding strategies to govern them is to use the Kraljic 
matrix (1983). This was developed to find strategies for suppliers based on two 
dimensions—profit impact and supply risk.  
The profit impact of a given supply item can be defined in terms of the volume purchased, 
the percentage of total purchase cost, or impact on product quality or business growth. 
Supply risk is assessed in terms of availability of the supply item, the number of suppliers, 
competitive demand, make-or-buy opportunities, storage risks and substitution possibilities 
(Kraljic, 1983). However, Guvåg et al., (2012) analyzed this on the light of a STX OSV 
shipyard more elaborately. 
 
 
Figure 28: Recommended positioning and supplier strategies for STX OSV. 
Source: Guvåg et al., (2012). 
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In Figure 28 depicting the Kraljic matrix, a buyer can categorize its supplier in four ways: 
first, a leverage items supplier with which buyer have no standard frame agreements, and 
can have strategic partnerships and exploit purchasing power; second, a non-critical items 
supplier which the buyer can utilize for standardization, inventory optimization, and order 
volumes; third, a bottleneck items supplier that the buyer can utilize to develop alternatives, 
secure volumes and retain for back-up plans; fourth, a strategic items supplier that may play 
a critical role for the buyer. The buyer should develop partnerships and close relationships 
with its suppliers, conduct a detailed market research on them and can, possibly, mull over 
a potential acquisition of a supplier. In a nutshell, WestCoat is in a strategic position with 
respect to Ulstein Shipyard, making it constantly assess the business model of the supplier 
and strategic decisions to either develop it through integration or create an internal or 
external alternatives.  
While putting in place the recommended positioning and supplier strategies based on the 
matrix, it has been found that WestCoat is a mixture of strategic and bottleneck items 
supplier. Thus, it was found that a long-term, three-year contract along with a partnership 
and closer relationship exist between them.  
However, as discussed, the relationship is, to some extent, assertive. Therefore, Ulstein 
Shipyard can think about acquiring the whole business of WestCoat. Thus, on the one hand, 
Ulstein Shipyard shares a good relationship with WestCoat, and on the other hand it has the 
option of developing alternatives. 
Naturally, the complexity of supply market is high as there can be other suppliers available. 
Finding an efficient supplier can be a challenge for Ulstein Shipyard considering the 
extensive services provided by WestCoat over the past 10 years. The importance of 
purchasing market is also high as Ulstein Shipyard purchases a significant amount of 
services from WestCoat. 
5.2.5 Relationship Continuance 
According to Chanchai and Young (2009), research has shown that expectations of 
continuance in buyer-supplier relationships are high when there are shared values between 
the exchange partners regarding what constitutes appropriate behavior in the relationship 
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994). As the relational norms between Ulstein Shipyard and WestCoat 
are low, the continuance expectancy decreased. Consequently, flexibility, information 
exchange and solidarity will be influenced by the low relational norms. 
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 5.2.6 Assertiveness and cooperativeness in managerial decision-making 
Wilmot and Hocker (2001) based negotiation, or conflict management, strategies on a two-
dimensional framework: assertiveness and cooperativeness. They based this framework on 
the five different negotiation strategies provided by Kilmann and Thomas (1975) — 
avoidance, accommodation, collaboration, competition, and compromise. Based on the case 
study findings and observations, it has been found that the assertiveness strategy of Ulstein 
Shipyard toward managerial decision-making was practiced with a tendency of concern for 
oneself. The greater the concern for self, the greater the individual’s assertiveness tendency. 
5.2.7 Lean Manufacturing tool (Value stream mapping) 
VSM is a lean manufacturing tool that acts as an enterprise improvement tool to assist in 
visualizing the entire production process, representing both material and information flow 
(Singh & Singh, 2013). Visualizing the entire production process in the outfitting phase in 
Ulstein Shipyard is considered to be too complicated.  
According to Rother and Shock (1999) the ultimate goal of VSM is to identify all types of 
waste in the value stream and to take steps to eliminate them by implementing a future-state 
value stream that can be accomplished within a short period of time. Therefore, Rother and 
Shock’s four steps of VSM has been implemented as shown in Figure29:  
 
Figure 29: Value stream mapping steps. 
Source: “Value Stream Mapping to Add Value and Eliminate Muda” (Rother and Shook, 1999). 
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5.2.7.1 Selecting a product family 
The focus was on one product family from the customer end of the value stream as the target 
for improvement. Based on a discussion with Ulstein Shipyard, a decision was made to work 
on the tank in the outfitting phase of the Ulstein project SX 121. There were other phases of 
the ship, but the decision to focus on the outfitting phase was made because it was the main 
value addition phase. Moreover, the tank was selected because tanks were the most 
expensive work of WestCoat.    
5.2.7.2 Drawing a current state map  
As the case study findings, observations and analysis indicated, there were deviations time 
regarding executing the project tasks by WestCoat. The VSM tool was used in order to 
visualize the elements of a specific production process from door to door where WestCoat 
conducted its tasks on the tank to remove the non-value added activities of the process. The 
process of drawing the current state map requires the following: 
1. Collecting information on the current state while walking through the actual material 
and information flows. 
2. Conducting a quick walk along the entire door-to-door value stream in order to 
understand the flow and sequence of the production process.  
3. Calculating the cycle and value added time for each task performed by WestCoat by 
using a stopwatch.  
There were several limitations to follow these criteria as the project had already been 
completed and ship had been delivered to the final customer. Therefore the current state 
map had been drawn based on the flow and sequence of the production process from Ulstein  
Shipyard Synergi system.  This contained the necessary elements of the map, such as 
processing activities and non-value added activities from the customer’s point of view. 
Moreover, the time duration for each task in the current value stream was assumed by the 
project leading coordinator who was responsible for allocating time slots for each task in 
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Figure 30: WestCoat current state map for tank production process. 
Source: Ulstein Shipyard Synergi system (2015). 
 
5.2.7.2.1 Current state map analysis:  
The analysis of the current state map for WestCoat value stream to carry its tasks on tanks 
focuses on the appraisal of the value added and non-value added activities. Figure 30 
displays WestCoat value stream for its tank tasks. The elements of the supplier’s value 
stream in the flow of information and raw materials into products consists of inspection, 
processing time, waiting time and reworks or repairs. The tasks in the current state map 
were linked together through arrows indicating the information and material flow alongside 
triangles represented the time a tank has to wait until it processed by the following task. 
Regarding the duration, specific number of man hours for each task in the current state was 
allocated at the bottom of each task based on the project coordinator’s assumptions. The 
lead time for tank tasks was displayed in arrows at the top of each task. Consequently, the 
total non-value added times or waste was calculated by subtracting the total processing time 
from the total lead time for the tank production process. Processing times in the current state 
map was considered to be the value added time and specified based on an assumptions of 
the project coordinator who was responsible for allocating time slots for each task in the 
project plan. It was one of the case study limitations to obtain the exact value added time 
from the processing time for each task. Therefore, the value added time was considered as 
the processing time. Moreover, the unit of time for each task is a man-hour and the unit of 
time for the current state map is a week, with each week representing 100 working hours.  
5.2.7.2.2 Current state map analysis results  
In the process of mapping the current state of the tanks, total duration average was around 
six- eight weeks to flow through the production process. According to the project plan, this 
process should have taken 3 weeks on an average.  So, there was a time deviation from the 
plan. This deviation took place as a result of conducting several non-value added activities 
such as inspection, waiting time, reworks and repairs. Moreover, as mentioned by a 
respondent from WestCoat, the tank tasks were considered to be the most complex works 
it performed. 
WestCoat’s value added activities in the current state map represented as the processing 
time (44.5-36 percent of the total time in the production process) where value was added 
from the customer’s perspective alongside non-added value activities—such as reworks or 
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repairs (22-18.5 percent) conducted by WestCoat, required inspections (16-12.5 percent) 
conducted by Ulstein Shipyard’s production control and waiting time (17.5-33 percent) 
where no inspection, processing or reworks occurs. In other words, this means that only 47-
36 hours of a 100 hours per week add value to the tank as a final product, while the 
remaining 53-64 hours were non-value added time. 
 
5.2.7.2.3 Causes of non-value added activities (obstacles or bottlenecks) 
Non-value added activities or waste refer to the total efforts of WestCoat that do not add 
value to the tanks as a final product from the perspective of the customer. There are several 
reasons for this: 
 
1.  Inspection:  Ulstein Shipyard conducted a crucial steel inspection to ensure that the 
quality of the steel met the quality standards. Therefore, non-value added time was 
consumed for this activity. In case the steel did not meet quality norms, additional non-
value added time was consumed to repair and reform the defects.  
2. Repairs or reworks: WestCoat primarily, alongside Ulstein Shipyard, conducts rework 
or repairs. According to a respondents from Ulstein Shipyard, those activities occurred 
due to defects in the quality of steel and inter-dependencies between the suppliers in 
conducting their tasks that caused delays and, in certain circumstances, damaged the 
work. In addition, details on reality and the requirements of work tasks by the planning 
department were missing.  
3. Waiting time:  Waiting time refers to the idle time in which no inspection, processing 
or reworks occurs. Waiting time hinders the smooth flow of the production process. It 
had been stated by a respondent from Ulstein Shipyard that waiting time occurred for 
several reasons such as unfavorable weather conditions with high humidity. 
Consequently, WestCoat workers had to suspend the painting tasks until conditions 
were proper to restart work. Moreover, he added that delays in delivering the necessary 
material and information contributed significantly to the waiting time, and WestCoat 
workers had to sit idle until they had received the required material and information to 
conduct their tasks. Meanwhile, from the guided tour of the dock yard and several 
interviews with the participants of the production process, it had been observed that 
multitasking affected the waiting time in the production process. In general, it had been 
observed that when WestCoat had to start its work in one task, it found that another 
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supplier had not completed its task yet. Therefore, WestCoat workers were shifted to 
begin another task rather than sitting idle until the other supplier had completed his 
work on the first task. Consequently, at that time WestCoat was not done with the other 
task whereas the supplier had finished with the first task but was delayed. Thus, a 
dilemma for WestCoat began as it needed more time to complete the second task and 
then come back to the first. This was another reason cause of the waiting time. 
It was believed that there would be scope for compressing the TCT and integrating the value 
stream of WestCoat into Ulstein Shipyard’s value stream by removing and mitigating the 
non-value added activities such as inspections, waiting times, repairs and reworks from the 
current state map.  
Later, a future state map was developed based on the current state map where the non-value 
added activities were removed from the value stream. This future state map let the value 
flow, the customer pull the value instead of push and offer suggestions on how to implement 
this future state map.   
5.2.7.3 Developing Future State Map 
An analysis of the current state map of the tank production process found that waiting time 
alongside rework and repairs were consuming more time than other activities. On the project 
plan, an average lead time of three weeks was required for WestCoat to finish its tank tasks. 
While the average for the actual lead time to finish their tasks on tank was 8 weeks. It means 
that in the project’s actual lead time, the waiting time consumed around one to two-and-half 
weeks, reworks or repairs consumed almost one-and-half weeks and inspection consumed 1 
week. In total, five weeks were consumed for non-value added activities from the customer’s 
point of view. Therefore, a future state map (figure 31) was developed where non-value 
added activities had been mitigated and removed from the current state map.  
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Figure 31: WestCoat future state map for tank production process. 





5.2.7.3.1 Future state map analysis: 
Future state map for tank production process was developed through following three steps. 
The first step is to remove the steel inspection activity from the current state map by shifting 
that activity backwards to take place in the source of the steel production, specifically in 
Poland. The actual lead time (630–780 man hours) for the tank tasks will be reduced by 2.5-
3 percent (20 man hours), and the likelihood of finding defects in the steel quality will 
decrease and influence the time consumed for repairs and rework. The second step is to 
improve the project plan for the tank tasks by taking into consideration the inter-
dependencies between the suppliers while they conduct their tasks. This will significantly 
reduce the time consumed to conduct repairs or rework by 15-19 percent (120 man hours) 
from the actual lead time (630–780 man hours). Repairs or rework can also be avoided by 
greater involvement of the project planners with the inner dock site. The third step is to 
mitigate and reduce the waiting time in the tank tasks by understanding clearly the realities 
and the requirements of the project plan tasks, integrating the information flow regarding 
the project plan tasks between WestCoat and Ulstein Shipyard by using the same Synergi 
operating system and prioritizing the plan tasks to avoid multitasking influences on the 
waiting time. Thus, it will help in mitigating and reducing the waiting time by 17.5–33 
percent (70–200 man hours) from the total lead time (630–780 man hours).  
5.2.7.3.2 Future state map analysis results 
In a nutshell, the project’s actual lead time in the developed future state map fell to 360–380 
man hours from 630–780 man hours, the waiting time decreased to 40-60 man hours from 
110-260 man hours, the time on rework or repairs fell to 20 man hours from 140 man hours 
and that on inspections (including steel inspection) dropped to 20 man hours from 100 man 
hours.  
5.2.7.4 Implementing future state map 
Implementing the developed future state map alongside obtaining the actual results requires 
long time scale to be processed and executed. Such a time scale was not available and has 
been considered to be one of the case study limitations. Therefore, guidelines and scenario 
on how the future state implementation step should take place had been developed based on 
Rother and Shock (1999). 
Before implementing the developed future state map, Ulstein Shipyard has to engage a 
person to manage the value stream to execute the future state map. The value stream 
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manager’s job is to lead the team that will operate the process in all business functions and 
be responsible for the cost, quality and delivery of the product in the current state while 
mapping and leading the implementation of the future state. First, the manager has to do the 
following tasks: 
5.2.7.4.1 Splitting Implementation into Steps 
The crucial point about implementing the future state map is to visualize it as a process of 
constructing chains of connected flows for different activities. This can be possible by 
dividing the developed future state map into loops and objectives as described below: 
- Ulstein Shipyard loop: This encompasses the flow of material and information between 
the customer and the performer (WestCoat) of the tank production process. Managing 
this loop will impact all the activities in the integrated value stream.     
- Ulstein Shipyard loop objectives: 
1. Develop a continuous flow from the first activity until the last activity in the value 
stream. 
2. Reduce the total lead time of the tank production process. 
3. Remove the steel inspection activity from the production process activities. 
4. Develop a pull system.  
- Extra loops: There are material and information flow loops between different activities 
(pulls). Each activity (pull system) in the value stream corresponds with the end of 
another loop.  
- Extra loops objectives: 
1. Reduce the waiting time between the production process activities. 
2. Improve the transparency and accuracy of the project plan tasks. 
3. Mitigate the influence of multitasking in the production process. 
4. Reduce the repairs and reworks activities in the production process. 
All these loops will help divide the implementation of the developed future state map into 
manageable pieces. 
5.2.7.4.2 Create Value Stream Plan 
The developed future state map gives an idea of where to go. Therefore, the value stream 
manager needs to create a yearly value stream plan that shows: 
1. What he is planning to do and when he will do it. 
2. Set measurable goals. 
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3. Set checkpoints with real deadlines and named reviewers to give feedback on the 
execution of his plan. 
The value stream manager can start the plan implementation by focusing on achieving 
continuous improvements in the loops of the developed future state value stream. The loop 
improvements includes: developing a continuous flow, establishing a pull system and 
eliminating waste in the value stream. Figure 32 displays a yearly value stream plan in which 
the value stream manager can set objectives and measurable goals, and keep tracking the 
execution of the plan.  
 
Figure 32: Yearly value stream plan. 
Source: Rother and Shook (1999).  
 
Once the value stream manager has understood what elements to implement in the developed 
future state, he needs to write them in a yearly value stream plan. This yearly plan can be 
used as a key performance indicator also to evaluate the performance of the production 
processes every quarter or month. Moreover, continuous improvements in the production 
process can be achieved by focusing on the unsuccessful objectives and goals in the yearly 
value stream plan instead of focusing on the accomplished objectives and goals.   
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5.2.7.4.3 Management responsibility: 
The responsibility for bringing about improvements in the value stream mainly belongs to 
Ulstein Shipyard management. It has to understand its role in visualizing the whole flow, 
improve the future lean flow and take the lead to implement the program. The shipyard’s 
management cannot delegate the implementation of the developed future lean flow to 
someone else (the front lines or consultants) as it is the only involved party that can visualize 
the total flow that cuts across departmental and functional boundaries. Implementing the 
developed future lean flow has to be a part of everyday activities in Ulstein Shipyard. 
Alongside the Ulstein Shipyard’s  management responsibility, a shipyard as a whole has to 
have the conviction that lean construction principles—such as meeting the requirements of 
the customer, reducing non-value added activities,  reducing the cycle time and variability 
and increasing flexibility and  transparency—can be adapted successfully accompanied by 
a robust desire to learn from trials and unsuccessful practices. 
The Ulstein Shipyard management has to follow these steps to achieve improvements in the 
value stream: 
1) Dedicate time and learn the lean principles for itself. 
2) Creation of the lean value stream has to be a part of Ulstein Shipyard’s activities. 
3) Focus on a small number of a specific goals managed by the value stream maps. 
4) Evolve a policy management by involving the lower levels in Ulstein Shipyard into 
formulating a policy and implementing it. When a lean shipyard matures, the policy will 
start to emerge from the interaction between the several levels of the organization instead 
of being generated from the top layers to prevail below.   
5) Develop a lean value stream has to be done with respect for people and with “respect for 







6.0 Conclusion  
The purpose of this thesis is to compress the TCT of Ulstein Shipyard’s ETO production 
networks by focusing on the activities performed by a key supplier. It was believed that a 
compression is possible by integrating the value stream of supplier WestCoat into that of 
Ulstein Shipyard. In the light of this purpose, two research questions were asked to reach 
the thesis goals. 
The first research question was about investigating how to compress the TCT. It was found 
that there were several time deviations across the ETO production networks (project phases). 
In order to understand the underlying causes, the reasons for those deviations were tracked 
and analyzed. The research and analysis were conducted on only the production network of 
the tanks.  
Time deviations occurred due to two reasons. The first of these was the nature of the 
relationship between Ulstein Shipyard as a buyer and WestCoat as a supplier. Ulstein 
Shipyard has an arm’s length relationship with WestCoat, which means it does not plan to 
fully integrate WestCoat into its production network. This is because it follows a policy of 
maintaining competitiveness among its suppliers. The nature of the relationship between the 
two influenced the communication and information flow with WestCoat claiming that 
information sharing during the outfitting phase was inefficient and delays occurred several 
times because of the lack of information required to conduct the tasks. This indicates that 
attention must be paid to making crucial efforts at information sharing alongside facilitating 
access to the operating system and use. These steps will help manage the buyer–supplier 
relationship efficiently. 
Second, time deviations in the ETO production networks occurred due to inefficient 
planning of the project which did not reflect the realities or the requirements of the working 
tasks across the networks. Examples of problems occurring due to inefficient planning are 
inter-dependencies between the suppliers while performing their tasks. 
Corresponding to those causes of time deviations, solutions have been suggested to counter 
those causes. Suggestions on enhancing the efficiency of the planning tasks by reshuffling 
them across members that are involved in executing Ulstein SX 121 project are given. 
The second research question was about investigating how to integrate a supplier (WestCoat) 
value stream into that of Ulstein Shipyard as well as explaining the obstacles and benefits of 
this integration.  
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Therefore, one of the lean manufacturing tools –the VSM tool– has been suggested to use. 
This tool was used to integrate the value stream of the supplier (WestCoat) into that of the 
buyer (Ulstein Shipyard).  
Moreover, VSM differentiates the activities in the current value stream into value added and 
non-value added activities, which showed potential areas of time reduction improvements. 
Thus, it serves as a base to develop a future state map for the integrated value stream, where 
non-value added activities were mitigated and removed from the value stream. Besides, 
suggestions were offered on how to remove those non-value added activities from the value 
stream.  
An analysis with regards to the developed future state map showed that actual lead time to 
execute the tanks production network could be reduced significantly and the production 
network flow (material and information flow) could be improved.  
Generally, the findings showed that compressing the TCT is possible by making 
improvements in the planning process, integrating the value stream of the supplier into the 




















7.0 Limitations of Study and Further Research 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to compress the TCT in Ulstein Shipyard’s ETO production 
networks. Prior to this thesis, not much research had been done in this area.  
Therefore, the authors of this thesis analyzed the current TCT in one of Ulstein Shipyard’s 
projects (Ulstein SX 121), and compared it with theories in order to understand how to 
achieve the compression. The analysis scope of the project was limited to only one 
production network, i.e. the production network of the tanks in the shipyard. This scope 
limitation occurred because analyzing all the production networks required a very long time, 
and expansive work and analysis. Therefore, this is considered to be one of the study 
limitations. 
Apart from the scope limitation, there were time limitations in: 
1) Calculating activities’ exact cycle times and value added time in the value stream 
because the authors were not able to be present when the activities took place. 
2) Implementing the developed future state as it required a longer period than the available 
time for the authors. 
Moreover, the case analysis was done in only five months whereas more time was required 
for an in-depth analysis. There were also other limitations when the study was conducted. 
Since the study was done only on a single ship, the project and all secondary and primary 
data were based on this ship. This had a subtle weakness in terms of generalizing the case 
findings and analysis. In addition, interviews were conducted only with the personnel related 
to a single ship. Therefore, there is scope for a bias in information sharing. Finally, this study 
only investigated a single supplier. Thus, all decisive outcomes were based on the data of 
that single supplier.  
This master thesis is the second delivery from the SMARTprod project that will continue 
the research until the end of 2016. Many findings analyzed and discussed in this thesis serve 
as the basis for further research in this project.  
Further research on the application of the concepts of continuous improvements on Ulstein 
Shipyard’s projects, the adoption of best practices to tie and integrate the relationship 
between the buyer and its suppliers, motion studies and the implementation of the developed 
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Appendix 1: Interview Guides 
 
 
Interview guide 1 
Introduction: 
Interviewee was thanked for his acceptance to be interviewed, give his time, share his 
experience and keep patience. Then he was asked politely for a permission to record the 
interview. Later, interviewee was informed about the master thesis, researchers objective 
and their reason for working on this case. Finally, he was asked about his position and work 
responsibilities in the company. 
Shipbuilding industry 
 
1) Can you explain the history and the current state of the Norwegian ship industry in 
Møre og Romsdal? 
2) What are the recent projects of Ulstein Shipyard? 
3) Which production networks executed in Ulstein Shipyard? 
4) Which suppliers are involving in Ulstein’s production networks? 
5) Who considered as key suppliers for Ulstein Shipyard? 
6) What are the main conditions of the contract between Ulstein Shipyard and the key 
suppliers? 
7) What are the main problems that faced the key suppliers? 
8) How these problems affect Ulstein’s projects? 
9) Where and when those problems occurred? 
10) Are there any reports or data that clarify those problems? 




Interview guide 2 
 
Introduction: 
Interviewee was thanked for his acceptance to be interviewed, give his time, share his 
experience and keep patience. Then he was asked politely for a permission to record the 
interview. Later, interviewee was informed about the master thesis, researchers objective 
and their reason for working on this case. Finally, he was asked about his position and work 
responsibilities in the company. 
Questions regarding the relationship between Ulstein Shipyard and the key supplier 
 
1) Which project selected to investigate the production processes? 
2) What are the production processes of this project? 
3) Who is the key supplier in this project? 
4) Where and when this key supplier starts his tasks? 
5) Which problems faced this supplier during executing his project tasks? 
6) Are there any performance reports or data that clarify those problems? 
7) What are the main causes of those problems? 
8) Who is responsible to track the execution and performance of the key supplier tasks? 
9) How the performance of the key supplier is measured? 
10) Which system used to communicate with the key supplier? 
11) How is the communication with the key supplier taking place? 
12) Are there any problems regarding the communication with the key supplier? 
13) What is the nature of the relationship with the key supplier? 
14) Does Ulstein Shipyard use only one key supplier to perform specific tasks? 




Interview guide 3 
 
Introduction: 
Interviewee was thanked for his acceptance to be interviewed, give his time, share his 
experience and keep patience. Then he was asked politely for a permission to record the 
interview. Later, interviewee was informed about the master thesis, researchers objective 
and their reason for working on this case. Finally, he was asked about his position and work 
responsibilities in the company. 
Questions to explore the root causes of the problems in Ulstein production networks 
 
1) What are the main problems during executing tasks in the project production networks? 
2) Are there any potential areas for improvements in the project production networks? 
3) Are there any performance reports or data that clarify those problems? 
4) Who are responsible to execute this production networks? 
5) How the project production networks executed? 
6) Where the production networks executed? 
7) When the production networks executed? 
8) What are the solutions to solve problems in the project production networks? 
9) Who should be involved to execute those solutions? 
Questions concerned project planning, coordinating and inter-dependencies between 
the suppliers during executing the project tasks. 
 
1) How the project planning process take place? 
2) Who is responsible from Ulstein Shipyard to create the project plan? 
3) How the plan transferred from Ulstein Shipyard to the key supplier? 
4) What are the tasks of each participant who involved in Ulstein project? 
5) How the information transferred between the involved participants in Ulstein project? 
6) Are there any examples of problems that occurred during executing the project tasks? 
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7) In case, there are inter-dependencies between suppliers to conduct their project tasks, 
who is responsible for those inter-dependencies? 
8) Why those inter-dependencies occurred? 
9) Are there any examples for such inter-dependencies between the suppliers? 
10) How the inter-dependencies between the suppliers been handled in the project? 
Questions concerned the contract agreements between Ulstein Shipyard and the key 
supplier 
 
1) What are the main contract agreements between Ulstein Shipyard and the key supplier? 
2) Does the contract covers all the necessary information and descriptions about the 
assigned working tasks? 
3) When the key supplier start his working tasks? 
4) How the key supplier respond to changing orders? 
5) Are there any extra working tasks assigned by Ulstein Shipyard to the key supplier? 




































































































































































Appendix 8: Ulstein Surface Specified Diagram 
 
 
 
